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CALL OF DUTY: A QUESTION OF POLICE INTEGRITY 
by 
Albert O. Gamarra 
 
 
Adviser: Professor Maria Haberfeld 
Policing is a profession linked to ideals of integrity and honor.  In spite of this, the 
profession has not been immune to corruption within its ranks.  Most research in policing 
has concentrated on police corruption rather than police integrity.  Research studies have 
examined the issue of corruption but they have encountered a multitude of measurement 
issues, making the direct study of corruption difficult. 
The goal of this research study was to replicate the seminal Klockars, Ivkovich, 
Harver & Haberfeld (2000) study examining police integrity within the United States.  
There has been a lack of research dedicated to the study of police integrity within the 
United States since the Klockars, et al. (2000) data was collected.  This study aims to 
further understand the dynamics of integrity issues within the United States with the 
intension of offering policy recommendations to help reduce and eliminate their 
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 Integrity is a trait that we all wish to encompass and project in our daily lives.  
Integrity requires a consistency in our values and the ability to not compromise them.  It 
is one of the most important traits to have in any occupation but especially for police 
because of their important role in maintaining societal order.  The goal of any police 
department is to enlist a force of integrity.  Nearly all police departments have highly 
scrutinized selection standards and guidelines that assist in reaching this goal of integrity 
(Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).  In spite of this policing has constantly been affected by 
instances of corruption in departments across the United States.  Corruption is the 
opposite of integrity.  It is the ability to compromise your values or those of your 
occupation.  Corruption and integrity have a complex relationship but are symbiotic 
because they cannot exist without each other.   
In spite of this most research in this field has concentrated on police corruption 
rather than police integrity.  Some areas of concentration have included definitional 
issues, typologies of corrupt activities, micro and macro level theoretical approaches, and 
accountability measures to reduce corruption.  Despite research into these areas there 
exist the need to further examine the topic because of the many debates that exist.  
Additionally, most researchers have failed to examine the many ―good‖ or officers of 
integrity that exist within many of these departments.  These officers can provide 
important insight into the factors that can improve integrity and eliminate corruption.  
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Examining these areas from the integrity research approach will allow for a more 
comprehensive understanding of corruption research.  
 The goal of this research study is to replicate the seminal Klockars, Ivkovich, 
Harver & Haberfeld (2000) study examining police integrity within the United States.  
This study will examine integrity among a sample of police officers in the United States 
using the Klockars, et al. (2000) integrity survey.  A comparison will be made to the 
Klockars, et al., (2000) study, to examine whether the behaviors and attitudes among 
police officers in the United States have changed in the decade since its publication.  In 
addition, it has been nearly two decades since the rash of high profile incidents that led to 
the influx of new research into police corruption (Klockars, Ivokovic & Haberfeld, 2006).  
Although researchers have duplicated the study internationally there has been little 
replication of the research domestically during the twenty years since the original project 
(Klockars, et al., 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006; Newham, 2002).  There is a need to 
examine whether the effects of time have either strengthened attitudes and behaviors 
associated with police integrity through increased attention and corresponding reforms or 






History of Policing 
 The evolution of policing as a profession had a major influence in the integrity 
and corruption issues of modern police.  Changes in training, accountability and policing 
models throughout time have affected levels of corruption and integrity.  Even today 
these factors have a central role in policing but to properly understand them we must 
understand the beginnings of the policing as a profession.  In nearly every society, 
whether it is tribal groups or large city states there has been a need for individuals to 
operate as peacemakers.  These individuals are normally given special privilege that 
allows them to use coercion against those who seek to violate societal norms (Bittner, 
1975).  The definitions of these norms are different across societies and can explain the 
differences in these peacekeepers across nations.  The individuals who served in these 
roles were not always identified as police.  This role was performed in many societies by 
the military, constables, private guards, and even in some cases outsiders (e.g. 
mercenaries) hired for the expressed purpose to maintain the political status quo (Bittner, 
1975). 
 In 1829 as the first professional police department was developed in London by 
act of the Parliament (Bittner, 1975).  The person responsible for this change was Sir 
Robert Peel who proposed the ―creation of a full-time, professional police force called the 
London Metropolitan Police‖ (White, 2007; 68).  Peel believed there was a need for a 
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more organized and professional police force because of increased crime and 
disorganization occurring in relation to the industrial revolution (Harring, 1983).  This 
police force would serve as a model to police departments in cities across the world.  Peel 
created a model that was based on a number of principles that remain integral to modern 
police departments.  These include: the quasi-military organizational structure, vital role 
of crime fighting, communication with the public about criminal affairs, proper 
recruitment and training techniques for qualified persons, and finally that police serve as 
the law in communities (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). 
 As in London industrialization would serve as the impetus for a professional 
police force in the United States.  Increased crime and disorganization along with 
population growth led to the need for a more organized police force.  Many cities in the 
United States would adopt the Peel model of policing (Walker, 1977).  The New York 
City Police Department was the first major city in the United States to adopt the Peel 
model (Harrison, 1999).  The major difference in policing models across both nations 
was that the London police department was controlled by the national government while 
police departments in the United States were controlled by local governments.  This 
―decentralized‖ model of policing led to more discretion being given to individual 
officers in the United States (Kelling and Moore, 1988). 
 This first era of policing in the United States has been called the Political Era by 
some leading scholars (Kelling and Moore, 1988).  This era of policing was highlighted 
by the lack of proper recruitment, selection and training (Haller, 1976).  Most police 
during this period were given their positions based on political associations or through 
bribery of officials (Harring, 1983).  Corruption and brutality among the police force was 
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pervasive during this era.  In many cases these activities were directly tied to the benefit 
of local elected officials (Harring, 1983).  There was little supervision of police officers 
and they were rarely held responsible for civil right violations. 
 The Pendleton Act of 1883 was an attempt to eliminate the system of ―spoils‖ that 
was pervasive in the federal government (Theriault, 2003).  Many civil service positions 
were rewarded to individuals based on their political association or bribery rather than 
actual qualifications.  This held true across many police departments in the United States 
(White, 2007).  Although this act was solely implemented on the federal level it would 
influence similar initiatives implemented on the local level to eliminate police corruption 
(White, 2007).  Other initiatives were also implemented to improve the state of policing 
with hopes of creating reforms that would professionalize the force.  August Vollmer, 
Robert Sylvester and O.W. Wilson were at the forefront of these reforms (Kelling and 
Moore, 1988; Walker, 1999).  Their proposals for reform were similar to those instituted 
by Sir Robert Peel in London.  These reforms included prioritizing crime fighting, 
removing political control, instilling an organizational design that created a centralized 
command and supervision, and mandating minimum standards for recruitment and 
training (Kelling and Moore, 1988).  The development of the automobile led to another of 
the reforms that was instituted during this time period.  The force transformed from foot 
patrol to automobile patrol in many communities.  Some argue that this change is partly 
responsible for the development of the ―police subculture‖ (White, 2007).  This ―police 
subculture‖ was defined by isolation from the public, the ―blue wall of silence‖ and an 
antagonistic view of non-police officers (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). 
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 Many of these reforms were implemented during the 1920s (Kappeler, Sluder, & 
Alpert, 1994).  During this decade police deviance was characterized by brutality related 
to racial tensions and corruption associated with the prohibition of alcohol.  In the 1930s 
and 1940s attention was drawn to the issue of police brutality and the third degree as a 
means of attaining information from suspects (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).  This would mark 
the first time that many in the media and public would be exposed to police corruption.  It 
also signaled a change as the public was no longer willing to ignore corruption and 
specifically brutality perpetrated by the police (Kappeler, et al., 1994).  
During the 1950s and 1960s increased media attention was given to police 
corruption as the public responded with awareness towards the illicit activities of police 
officers.  In addition, attention was drawn to the ―Professional Policing‖ model and its 
possible influence on police corruption.  Specifically, how isolation from the general 
public and an aggressive policing style can create conditions that promote corruption 
(Kappeler, et al., 1994).  A number of notable cases related to search and seizures and 
police interrogations occurred during this time, leading to restrictions in how police could 
interact with the public (Skogan & Meares, 2004).  This time period was marked by a 
number of reforms in Due Process (Walker, 1999).  The 1960s brought about a sharp 
increase in the number of violent crimes.  This increased police interaction with the 
general public, creating more opportunity for corruption (Walker, 1983).   
The 1970s was notable because of the Knapp commission that investigated police 
corruption within the New York City Police department.  The impetus for this 
investigation was Frank Serpico, an honorable police officer who nearly lost his life 
because he refused to participate or ignore the corrupt behavior within the department 
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(Kappeler, et al., 1994).  The commission found organized corruption in the department 
with nearly half of the department personnel participating in mostly payoff violations 
(Knapp Commission, 1972).  These payoffs were mostly associated with gambling, 
construction, bars, traffic violations and other associated crimes.  Another issue was the 
common occurrence of officers accepting gratuities and getting bribes as part of their 
daily activities.  The commission found that most administrators were not actively 
monitoring their subordinates and many departments lacked the ability to properly 
investigate corruption.  Problems within internal affairs sector was the main culprit in 
corruption issues permeating the department.  Increased selection, recruitment and 
accountability measures in addition to proper supervision were among the major 
recommendations made by the commission (Knapp Commission, 1972). 
The 1980s can be considered a transitional period for many police departments in 
the United States.  A number of research initiatives attempted to challenge the 
Professional Policing model and its link to the development of a ―police subculture‖ 
(White, 2007).  This research brought about a number of concepts associated with 
Community Oriented Policing.  This is the newest model of policing and it has been 
growing over the past couple of decades (Chappell, 2008).  It is predicated on two beliefs, 
the first being that the police cannot prevent crime without the assistance of the 
community and that social disorder can lead to increases in crime (Kelling and Moore, 
1988). 
The 1990s brought about a new wave of crime commissions in New York, 
Chicago and Philadelphia (Government Accounting Office, 1998).  These commissions 
differed from earlier commissions because of the type of corruption found to be pervasive 
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(Mollen Commission, 1994).  The Knapp commission determined that corruption was 
mostly related to gambling related payoffs and gratuities with most police involved being 
considered ―grass eaters‖.  The 1994 Mollen Commission into corruption in the New 
York City police department determined that most corruption was related to drug crimes 
with money, power and vigilante justice being the main motivating factors behind these 
activities (Mollen Commission, 1994).  The crimes committed during the Knapp 
Commission were mostly consensual while the Mollen Commission was mostly 
characterized by blatant abuse and brutality (Mollen Commission, 1994).  The Mollen 
Commission also identified ―meat eaters‖ as becoming the norm among corrupt officers 
(Mollen Commission, 1994).  Similar to the Knapp Commission accountability measures 
and supervision were ineffective in deterring corruption as found by the Mollen 
Commission.  This was associated with the new structure of specialty units created to 
combat the drug war.  These units were participating in blatant crimes and because of the 
secretive nature of the units lacked proper supervision.  The commission recommended 
that accountability be improved so that specialty units are properly monitored to reduce 
opportunities for corruption.  These findings from the Mollen Commission also held true 
in a number of other major police departments (GAO, 1998). 
The greatest influence on policing and nearly all areas of justice in the 21
st
 
century has been the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  These attacks led to legal reforms and 
expanded police powers (Caldero & Crank, 2004).  They have also created the 
opportunity for corruption.  Noble cause corruption has the potential to become the 
pervasive form of corruption in the aftermath of 9/11.  Caldero & Crank (2004) posited 
that the means even if they are corrupt, are acceptable if they achieve the ends of 
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policing.  The extent of corruption during this decade is still being studied and will not be 
known for years. 
 Policing is an evolving field exemplified by its ever changing eras and 
accompanying organizational changes.  It is a unique career and has a vital role in 
democracy (Caldero & Crank, 2004).  Throughout history police have been obliged to 
many duties including: crime fighting, order maintenance, political advocacy, 
information gathering and providing social services to the community (Bittner, 1975).  
These all go well beyond the law enforcement duties that are generally associated with 
police.  These duties at times have conflicting goals that create opportunities for police 
corruption.  It is this dynamic that has made eliminating corruption from policing 
difficult.  The irony of policing is that they represent the law and are supposed to protect 
the rights of citizens.  However, these goals can conflict at times creating opportunities 
for corruption (Caldero & Crank, 2004). 
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Corruption 
 The multiple functions of policing and the complex nature of their interaction 
make it a challenging profession.  Policing provides many opportunities for corrupt 
behavior.  But the issue of corruption is not unique to the field of policing (Moran, 2005).  
Corruption can be committed in nearly any profession ranging from the stockbroker that 
sells insider information, to the accountant who ―cooks‖ the books.  Even within the 
justice system there are corrupt judges and prosecutors.  However, corruption among 
police officers is the most publicized because police are the face of the law. 
 Many researchers have offered their own definition of police corruption but there 
have been no universally agreed upon definition (Punch, 1985; Stana, 2003).  These 
definitions range from the very broad, that encompass all types of police deviance, to the 
very specific that exclude nearly all but a select few deviant police activities (Goldstein, 
1975).  Since ―corruption is a form of police deviance, before defining police corruption, 
police deviance must be conceptualized‖ (Bucak, 2009; 3).  Although some corruption 
can be considered as police deviance, not all deviant activities committed by police can 
be defined as corruption. Deviance has long been defined by social scientist as 
participating in behavior that violates the norms of a society (Durkheim, 1938). 
Durkheim‘s (1938) definition of deviant behavior prevents the creation of a 
universal definition for police deviance because the definition would rely upon the norms 
of the department and society.  Each society has their view of acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior.  This makes defining deviance much less police deviance a 
difficult task for any researcher (Kappeler, et al., 1994).  Despite this Kappeler, et al. 
(1994) developed a model upon which they define police deviance as violating the 
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standards of both the ―external‖ or societal norms and the ―internal‖ or occupational 
norms.  Another important aspect of their definition of deviance was ―the threat of social 
sanctions‖ (Kappeler, et al., 1994; 16).  Kappeler, et al., (1994) believed that a third 
informal set of rules and customs existed within individual police departments.  The 
violation of these informal rules could also be defined as police deviance. 
Barker & Roebuck (1973) supported this argument for a third set of informal rules 
governing activities within police departments.  They found there were operating norms 
in all police departments that differed from ―either the law or departmental written rules‖ 
(Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 8).  To analyze any corrupt police behavior there must be a 
definitional analysis at the formal, informal and social levels (Barker and Roebuck, 
1973).  Towards this goal they defined police corruption ―as any type of prescribed 
behavior engaged in by a law enforcement officer who receives or expects to receive, by 
virtue of his official position, an actual or potential unauthorized material reward or gain 
(Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 9). 
 Punch (1985) included in his definition of police deviance activities such as: 
―brutality, discrimination, sexual harassment, intimidation, and illicit use of weapons‖ 
(12).  He argued that corruption was simply a form of police deviance that encompassed 
―profiting in some way from abuse of power and the abuse of power itself‖ (Punch, 1985; 
12-13).  He further divided corruption into a four-level typology: Straightforward 
corruption, predatory corruption, combative corruption, and corruption as perversion of 
justice (Punch, 1985).  These types all have different motivations and rewards for 
participants.  Punch (2000) later divided police deviance into 3 activities: corruption (to 
do something or not do something in ―exchange for money or gifts‖ from an external 
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source), misconduct (mostly violations of minor internal disciplinary regulations) and 
police crime (excessive force and other criminal endeavors including those that could 
violate a person‘s rights) (302).  
 Goldstein (1975) defines police corruption as ―the misuse of authority by a police 
officer in a manner designed to produce personal gain for himself or for others‖ (3).  His 
definition differs from those of other authors because he argues that corruption does not 
have to benefit the corrupter.  Corruption could be committed for the benefit of others, 
which encompasses a wide range of activities that would be eliminated based on 
definitions offered by other authors (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; Punch, 1985).  Although 
all types of bribery can be considered corruption based on Goldstein‘s (1975) definition, 
not all corruption is bribery. 
 Caldero and Crank (2004) took a new approach to define police corruption.  They 
divide corruption into two major types: economic corruption and noble-cause corruption.  
Economic corruption is easily understood as it encompasses financial rewards through 
abuses of power.  However, in their book Caldero and Crank (2004) ignore this common 
form of corruption instead choosing to concentrate on noble-cause corruption.  The 
precipice for this movement away from economic crime was the argument that reforms in 
policing have led to large decreases in economic crime during the 20
th
 century (Caldero 
and Crank, 2004).  These reforms have created opportunities for noble cause corruption 
which is ―corruption committed in the name of good ends‖ (Caldero and Crank, 2004; 2).  
Caldero and Crank (2004) argue that in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, increased 
police powers have created ample opportunity for this type of corruption. 
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 Klockars, et al. (2000) defined corruption as ―the abuse of police authority for 
gain is one type of misconduct that has been particularly problematic‖ (1).  This 
definition again brings up the complexities in defining corruption because it does not 
explain the type of gains and identifies corruption as only ―one type of misconduct‖ 
further highlighting the issue of understanding police deviance (Klockars, et al., 2000; 1).  
Ivkovich (2005) narrows this further by distinguishing corruption from other forms of 
police misconduct by highlighting ―achievement of personal gain‖ as the main factor 
influencing it (547).   
Sherman (1978) also describes ―personal gain‖ as an integral part of defining 
corruption but includes the illegal use of the organization within this definition (30).  
Sherman (1978) argues that this definition is best because it can be used for both 
individual and organizational examinations of the topic.  Perry (2003) believed that 
nearly all acts of corruption can be considered police deviance and that not all corrupt 
acts are completely corrupt.  He found that the process of committing corruption can 
encompass many illicit activities that could be considered corrupt, deviant and in some 
cases non-deviant. 
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Types of corruption 
 Barker and Roebuck (1973) offered one of the earliest attempts at creating a 
typology of police corruption.  This typology was later altered by Punch (1985).  Their 
typology has been widely cited and overlaps with nearly all activities included in 
corruption definitions. 
Corruption of Authority 
 Police officers who accept goods given to them solely because of their position in 
society have committed a corrupt act.  These goods include free and discounted coffee, 
meals, commercial and non commercial goods.  This is a common occurrence even 
though most departments have expressed written rules that such activities are in violation 
of police mandates (Knapp Commission, 1972).  Most police officers feel they are 
accepting a gift for protecting the community.  In the United States most officers are 
unlikely to report such activities within their department (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 
Klockars, et al., 2006).  This differs from other nations where such activities are 
disciplined severely (Huberts, Lamboo & Punch, 2003).  This behavior places the officer 
receiving the gift, in debt to the person giving the gift presenting an opportunity for 
repayment by overlooking a future indiscretion.  Some consider this type of activity an 
entry point to other more serious forms of misconduct (Sherman, 1985) 
Kickbacks 
 This activity is similar to corruption of authority because the officer receives 
goods from an otherwise legitimate business person and the receiving officer is usually in 
good standing in their department.  The difference is the good or services are received in 
exchange for referring customers to a number of service sector businesses (Barker and 
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Roebuck, 1973).  This activity is normally accepted within many departments despite 
being against organizational rules but becomes more likely to be disciplined if cash is the 
reward for the activity.  Both corruption of authority and kickbacks are considered types 
of gratuities for police officers because of the hazard and low pay normally associated 
with the profession (Walker, 1983). 
Opportunistic Thefts 
 This type of corruption takes place when an on duty officer steals goods or money 
during the performance of their duties.  This could encompass taking money from 
suspects, stealing jewelry from homes they investigate, or stealing items from the 
evidence room.  This type of activity is viewed more severely than the earlier examples 
(Barker and Roebuck, 1973).  The seriousness of this offense and likelihood of being 
reported is normally associated with the size of the theft, its detection by victims and the 
informal policies within departments (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). 
Shakedowns 
 During the service of their duties police officers will witness criminal violations.  
Some officers will take advantage of this and seek ―hush money‖ from the violator.  
These rewards can be either: money, goods or services.  These can be sought from both 
normal citizens committing minor violations and known criminals committing major 
criminal violations.  Money received from otherwise normal or law abiding citizens is 
considered ―clean‖ money, while money received from known felons and violators is 
considered ―dirty‖ money.  Fellow officers are more likely to report instances involving 
―dirty‖ money rather than ―clean money‖.  Participation in shakedowns by officers can 
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ruin a departments‘ reputation and erode community confidence in the justice system 
(Barker and Roebuck, 1973).  
Protection of Illegal activities 
 At times those involved in illicit activity will seek to ―payoff‖ police officers for 
protection, to avoid prosecution and prevent harassment.  These individuals are normally 
involved in illegal gambling rings, pornography rings, and other frequently victimless 
crimes.  This type of activity is also committed by legitimate businesses that participate 
in illegal activities such as truck companies paying to transport illegal goods or goods for 
which they are not licensed to transport.  Acceptance of this activity is normally based on 
how widespread such activity is within the department (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). 
The Fix 
 This type of activity is divided into two subtypes: ―(1) the quashing of 
prosecution proceedings following the offender‘s arrest and (2) the taking up (disposal of 
record) of traffic tickets‖ (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 34).  This can range from minor 
fixing such as disregarding a traffic ticket for a small fee, to major offenses such as 
tampering with evidence for a felony case to affect the outcome.  This activity is 
normally subject to severe punishment under departmental rules.  In spite of this minor 
offenses are normally disregarded by fellow officers and only the most severe types of 
fixes are likely to be reported (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). 
Direct Criminal Activities or Police crime 
 At times a police officer will not need to be corrupted by another individual.  
These officers chose to participate in criminal activities such as robberies and burglaries.  
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They do this for personal gain and are normally not supported by their peers and face 
serious punishment for have participating in these activities (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). 
Internal Pay-Offs 
 This type of corrupt activity is unique because it involves solely police officers as 
both corruptor and corrupted.  ―Bribing‖ officers for assignment to patrol routes, days off 
and popular assignments are examples of this.  This type of activity may also involve 
other types of corruption such as fixes.  Police officers may pay off fellow officers to 
destroy evidence in cases against themselves or paid associates.  This type of activity is 
normally associated with widespread corruption within departments and can severely 
undermine the justice system in communities (Barker and Roebuck, 1973). 
Flaking and Padding  
 There is one corrupt activity that has received much research attention recently 
that was missing from the 8 part typology offered by Barker and Roebuck (1973).  
―Flaking‖ or ―Padding‖ involves altering evidence by either planting false evidence at 
crime scenes or altering evidence to create the impression of criminal involvement by a 
defendant (Punch, 1985).  This type of activity is normally associated with ―noble-cause‖ 
corruption (Caldero and Crank, 2004).  Officers will participate in this activity because 
they would like to ―put away‖ a known felon but lack the evidence necessary.  By 
altering evidence they feel they are not committing a crime because they are putting away 
someone who will probably commit criminal acts in the future.  This activity can be done 
to protect an officers criminal associates and to put away competitors of an officers 
criminal associates (Punch, 1985). 
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Police officer typology 
 The Knapp Commission defined a two-part typology of corrupt police officers 
(Knapp Commission, 1972).  This two part typology has identified corrupt police officers 
as falling into two groups either ―meat eaters‖ or ―grass eaters‖.  This typology was later 
expanded by Barker (2006) to include three other groups of officers within corrupt police 
organizations.  The ―grass eaters‖ were police officers that take gratuities from the public 
such as free cups of coffee or discounts on household items.  They mostly participated in 
relatively minor offenses that violate departmental guidelines but were nevertheless 
found to be common within many departments (Knapp Commission, 1972).   
―Meat eaters‖ were identified as those individuals that actively seek to participate 
in illicit activities.  They are considered to be among the worst of all corrupt officers 
because they participate in criminal activity.  They are solely concerned with personal 
gains and will impede investigations if it means attaining these gains (Barker & Roebuck, 
1973).  They committed a diverse range of crimes with the Knapp commission 
identifying gambling payoffs as being the most common type of crime among meat eaters 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Knapp Commission, 1972).  The Mollen Commission also 
examined corruption in the New York City police department.  It found that by the 1990s 
―meat eaters‖ within the department were now participating in mostly drug related 
offenses (Mollen Commission, 1994). 
Barker (1986) believed that three additional groups of officers existed within 
corrupt police organizations.  He defined them as ―white knights‖, officers that ―are 
honest to a fault‖ (62).  They stand by their ethical beliefs and this can lead to issues with 
those within the department who do not share their extreme view of ethical issues.  
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Another group was ―rogues‖, officers who are blatant in their participation in criminal 
activity.  They participate in criminal activity on a more persistent level than even those 
corrupt officers considered to be ―meat eaters‖.  The last group identified was ―straight 
shooters‖, honest officers who do not participate in any type of corrupt activity but did 
not report the activity of other officers.  They do not approve of corruption but are willing 





 The earliest explanations for police corruption centered on the individual being 
responsible for their actions.  It posits that a few bad individuals or ―apples‖ were 
responsible for most police corruption (Walker, 1983; Delattre, 2006).  It was argued that 
morally and personally corrupt individuals were able to infiltrate the department, using 
their predisposition to deviance to commit illicit activities (Bucak, 2009).  These 
individuals acted without involvement, knowledge or support of their co-workers and 
their superiors.  This theory receives a lot of support from police supervisors because it 
provides a quick fix to the problem of corruption.  It creates the impression that once 
these problem officers are identified and removed, the problem of corruption will be 
eliminated from the department.  It furthers the image of police being bound by the law 
and that they are subject to the same discipline as those in the general public (Kappeler et 
al., 1994). 
 A problem with this view of corruption is its failure to explain cycles of 
corruption that exist in departments such as New York and the pervasiveness of 
corruption in other departments (Klockars, Ivkovich, and Haberfeld, 2004).  Another 
problem with the rotten apple theory is its failure to explain how seemingly honest and 
moral officers become corrupted and begin to participate in illicit activities only after 
joining the department (White, 2007).  The Knapp commission further disproved the 
―rotten apple‖ theory because it found that corruption was common within the department 
with nearly all individuals in the department being aware or participating in corruption 
themselves (Knapp Commission, 1972).  This has also been found to be the case in other 
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departments including those in Washington DC, Chicago, Oakland and Los Angeles 
(Klockars, et al., 2006).  All of these concerns have led some researchers to argue that the 
―rotten apple‖ theory should not be used to explain police corruption (Goldstein, 1975).   
 In spite of these criticisms support for rotten apple theory has been found by some 
researchers.  Walker, Alpert and Kenney (2001) found that most police corruption was 
caused by a small number of individuals within the department.  Their findings indicated 
that nearly 90 percent of all problems were caused by 10 percent of the workforce.  Porter 
and Warrender (2009) found in their analysis of deviant police behavior that most 
officers involved in this activity were likely to act alone.  There are also cases that 
support the rotten apple theory such as that of the Miami River Cops who were involved 
in drug related corruption, which was not found to be pervasive within the department 
(Delattre, 2006).  The 1994 Mollen Commission of the New York City police department 
also found support for this theory as it identified only a small number of corrupt officers 
who were participating in drug related corruption (Mollen Commission, 1994).  Klockars 
et al., (2006) argue that individual integrity is a part of organizational integrity and that 
they cannot exist without each other.  But at times the processes that establish them may 
be different.  The nature of this relationship is too complex to understand. The conflict of 
support and rejection for this theory and its link to organizational integrity warrants the 
need to further examine the issues that could be responsible for police corruption. 
Rotten Orchard/Barrel 
 The ―rotten orchard/barrel‖ theory posits that just like any other organization 
police departments are responsible for the deviance that occurs among its members.  
Ermann and Lundman (1978) created a four part framework for organizational deviance.  
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First, to be considered deviant the activities of the organization must be in violation of 
greater societal norms; Second, actions must be supported at some level within the 
organization; Third, administrators must know and support the deviant activity (either 
actively or passively) and Finally, new members to the organization must be socialized 
into the ―norms and rationalizations supportive of such an action‖ (Ermann and 
Lundman, 1978; 57-58). 
The nature of the policing profession provides the opportunity to engage in 
corrupt activities that would otherwise not be available to individuals (Johnson & Cox III, 
2004-5).  Furthermore, it is argued that this behavior is known, supported and in some 
cases even taught to individuals by their co-workers and/or their superiors (Delattre, 
2006).  The structural aspects of the policing profession that have been identified as being 
responsible for corruption include: Legitimizing Police Deviance, Public Perception, 
Isolation and Discretion, Supervision, Division of Labor/Specialization, Limited Career 
Mobility and Salary, Police Subculture and organizational model (Kappeler, et al., 1994). 
Legitimizing Police Deviance 
 The police have a unique role in society because they participate in activities and 
take actions that in many cases are illegal for nearly everyone else in society.  Police can 
conduct search and seizures, use force to subdue suspects, and access private information 
about citizens (Kappeler, et al., 1994).  Kappeler, et al., (1994) found that even though 
police decisions are bound by the law, they have vast discretion in interpreting the law as 
it best applies to their interactions with the public.  This can lead to misconduct over time 
as officers adopt a view of being above the law.  Creating a conflict of policing because 
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they are given a power that places them above the law yet they must follow the law 
(Caldero and Crank, 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006).  
Isolation and Discretion 
 The Professional Policing model promoted by Vollmer in the early 20
th
 century 
created an environment where police mostly operated in isolation from the general public 
(Kappeler, et al., 1994).  In addition police interactions with the general public are 
normally isolated with very few witnesses available.  Police are expected to rely upon 
personal discretion when interacting with suspects.  This creates plenty of opportunity for 
officers to participate in illicit activities and victimize individuals from the general 
public.  Victims of the police will normally ignore reporting violations for fear of 
reprisals by officers (e.g. drug dealers) (Kappeler, et al., 1994). 
Supervision 
 Policing is a field where there is little interaction with supervision.  In most cases 
while performing their duties and interacting with the general public most police officers 
have no interaction with supervisors.  This creates the opportunity for officers to 
participate in illicit activities.  Another issue with supervision is that many officers are 
supervised by former partners, colleagues and/or friends (Kappeler, et al., 1994).  This 
can lead to conflicts of interest where supervisors will not discipline individuals or will 
ignore illicit activities by those working beneath them (Kappeler, et al., 1994).  Engel and 
Worden (2003) found that the lack of direction from supervision will lead to officers 
using their own discretion to influence decisions.  These misinformed officers‘ actions 
are more likely to result in incidents of corruption. Also certain individuals may not have 
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been properly trained to be supervisors; this poor supervision can create opportunity for 
corruption to flourish within many police departments (Kappeler, et al., 1994). 
Division of Labor/Specialization 
 Specialized units are meant to be a solution to problematic issues within 
communities.  These include units dedicated to narcotics, homicide, gangs and other 
illicit activities.  These units have been found to be breeding grounds for corruption 
within police departments (Klockars, et al., 2004).  This is because these units have less 
supervision, greater secrecy and plenty of opportunity to participate in corrupt activities 
when compared to normal patrol officers.  These individuals also tend to have stronger 
ties between unit members and increased support for the ―blue wall of silence‖ among its 
members (Kappeler, et al., 1994). 
Limited Career Mobility and Salary 
 Police officers are restricted in their ability to advance within departments.  Most 
departments only have limited positions available with large numbers of individuals 
vying for these supervisory positions that come with increased pay.  The constraints of 
promotion create an environment where many individuals are unsatisfied with their salary 
or position of power within a department.  These individuals can becomes dissatisfied 
and begin to participate in illicit activities as a means to improve their economic situation 
or to get back at those they feel overlooked them (Kappeler, et al., 1994). 
Police Subculture 
 The police subculture is identified as perhaps the most responsible part of the 
policing structure that leads to corruption.  One of the key aspects of the subculture is the 
blue wall of silence.  The code ―informally prohibits or discourages police officers from 
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reporting the misconduct of their colleagues‖ (Klockars, et al., 2000; 2).  It argues that 
since police can only rely upon each other they should be willing to condone the 
misconduct of fellow officers (Chan, 2003).  Kaariainen, Lintonen, Laitinen, and Pollock 
(2008) argued that because of the pressures of control and suspicion, ―a police officer 
may lose his/her confidence both in the citizen and in the police administration‖ leading 
to characteristics (e.g. isolation, etc.) that result in the code of silence (87). Some view 
the code as a necessary part of survival for those in the force (Bucak, 2009).  It is unique 
because its parameters can differ not only between different nations but within nations in 
police departments (Klockars, et al., 2000).  Klockars, et al., (2006) found support for the 
blue wall of silence especially when it related to less serious criminal incidents.  But all 
officers who participated in this activity were not necessarily corrupt themselves.  At 
times officers will wish to protect partners from harm even if they do not agree or 
participate in these illicit activities (Klockars, et al., 2006).  Weisburd, Greenspan, 
Hamiliton, Williams and Bryant (2000) found that even though most police officers did 
not accept the ―code of silence‖ nearly two-thirds believed that other officers followed it 
even in cases of serious abuses of power. 
 The development of a subculture personality is the result of the dangers that go 
with policing as an occupation and the cynicism about the justice system that 
accompanies it (Bittner, 1975).  The ―us vs. them‖ mentality is an embodiment of this 
personality (Westley, 1970).  The ―symbolic assailant‖ is another development that 
occurs because of the subculture personality.  Police use identifiers based on experience 
to identify potential threats or indicators of illicit activity (Skolnick, 1994).  Reuss-Ianni 
(1983) defined guidelines that shaped the police subculture as being divided among 
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―street cop‖ and ―management cop‖ culture.  She identified twenty-one maxims that 
define ―street cop‖ culture and their interactions with other officers.  She found that 
conflicting values between these two cop cultures leads to further development of the 
subculture personality (Reuss-Ianni, 1983). 
Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) believed that the police personality developed from the 
quasi-military model of policing.  They argued that police see themselves as soldiers in a 
never ending war which leads to misconduct (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).  Others have 
found that the police subculture can undermine the official guidelines of police 
departments with written rules being ignored as officers instead choose to let informal 
subculture guidelines influence their behavior (Klockars, Ivkovich & Haberfeld, 2005; 
Schafer & Martinelli, 2008).  Supporting this Terrill, Paoline III, & Manning (2003) 
found that close embodiment of this police subculture personality can lead to coercive 
and possibly corrupt behavior among officers.  This can occur despite the fact that 
officers understand that they are in violation of agencies guidelines. 
Police organizational model 
Policing within the United States is decentralized to the effect of nearly 20,000 
police agencies existing across local, state and federal levels (Klockars, et al., 2004).  The 
decentralization model is supported by citizens for two reasons: First, the immense lack 
of distrust many U.S. citizens have of the federal government and second, many citizens 
believe that a local police department will be more concerns with the needs of the 
community (Klockars, et al., 2004).  Compared to the integrated policing model used by 
the London Metropolitan police department it appears that there is more room for 
corruption within the American system.  A comparison of integrity across agencies found 
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that police within the American model of policing were more likely to lack integrity 
especially when compared to the London Metropolitan police department (Klockars, et 
al., 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006).  The lack of oversight and differences in organizational 
rules across agencies in the decentralized policing model creates opportunities for 
corruption to occur within many departments (McCormack, 1986). 
Noble Cause Corruption/ Golden Apple 
 Most police corruption research has used the ―rotten apple‖ and/or ―rotten 
orchard/barrel‖ theoretical approach to explain misconduct within police departments.  
These theories are predicated on the belief that officers that participate in corruption are 
acting in their own self interest to attain some type of personal gain.  However, there is a 
third approach that attempts to explain police corruption that is not in the self interest of 
officers or results in personal gain.  Noble cause corruption is defined as corruption 
committed to attain a good end but using illicit means to attain these goals (Harrison, 
1999; Caldero and Crank, 2004; Crank, Flaherty & Giacomazzi, 2007).  Noble cause 
corruption can involve using a number of illicit means that violate due process, and 
procedural policies to achieve policing goals.  These goals include maintaining public 
order and securing public safety (Caldero and Crank, 2004). 
 Testilying is a type of noble cause corruption that has been studied extensively in 
the literature (Cunningham, 1999; Foley, 2000).  Testilying is the name given to perjury 
committed by police officers as identified by the Mollen Commission.  The occurrence of 
perjury was found to be a common occurrence among many officers in the New York 
Police department at the time especially as it related to drug related crimes (Mollen 
Commission, 1994).  Foley (2000) found that as it related to drug, sex and crimes against 
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children officers were found to be more likely to commit perjury.  These crimes elicit an 
emotional response in officers that the other crimes studied did not.  This supports the 
view that officers will break the law to achieve the ―greater good‖ as they view it. 
Noble cause corruption is viewed as excusable wrong doing and has been 
controversial among researchers and practitioners (Caldero and Crank, 2004).  Those 
who support the use of noble cause corruption believe that officers who participate in 
these activities are not ―rotten apples‖ or ―rotten orchards/barrels‖ instead they refer to 
officers who participate in these activities as being ―golden apples‖.  They are ―golden 
apples‖ because they are doing all that is necessary to achieve the goals of the 
organization (Caldero and Crank, 2004).  Critics argue that officers who participate in 
―noble cause corruption‖ are no better than officers that participate in other corrupt 
activities.  That no matter the ends the means should never violate the law because no 
one, not even the police themselves are above the law.  Critics also argue that noble cause 
corruption can lead to material rewards corruption because it creates an environment for 
individuals to feel above the law (Caldero and Crank, 2004). 
Noble cause corruption has become an increasingly common issue in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks.  Expanded police powers through the relaxing of 
constitutional rights and the want to achieve noble ends of preventing another attack have 
provided incentive for officers to participate in illicit means to achieve their goals 





 century but it has been decreasing over the last century (Caldero and 
Crank, 2004).  In the post 9/11 world it appears that noble cause corruption has the 
possibility to become the predominant form of police corruption within the United States. 
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Corruption prevention 
 The impact of corruption has not gone unnoticed by police departments, the 
public and government.  There have been a number of accountability measures 
implemented that attempt to reduce, prevent and eliminate corruption.  These 
accountability measures can be examined using the framework posited by Ermann and 
Lundman (1978) that argued that all organizations are controlled by ―controller 
organizations‖ outside of the organization to reduce deviance (59).  These ―controller 
organizations‖ can be a parent company, regulatory agency, or even the general public.  
This presence of ―controller organizations‖ however is not enough to deter deviance.  
Ermann and Lundman (1978) found that a combination of routine and unexpected review 
of organizations by ―controller organizations‖ was important to ensure integrity.  
―Certainty and Severity‖ of punishment to reduce organizational deviance is important 
because of the much more rational nature of organizational deviance when compared to 
the random nature of most individual deviance (Ermann and Lundman, 1978; 64).  
Accountability measures are a means of attempting to ensure this ―certainty and severity‖ 
of punishment deters deviance among police departments. 
Some of the accountability measures are internal, in that they are created and 
monitored by the department itself.  Others are external, in that an organization outside of 
the department is conducting the investigation into issues of corruption.  External 
accountability measures create openness and transparency that some believe does not 
exist in internal accountability measures (Klockars, et al., 2005).  These different types of 
accountability measures can be used individually or in combination with other measures 
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to address corruption within the department.  The type of accountability measure that 
works best will differ based on the department. 
A major critique of most internal mechanisms of police accountability is that the 
police are themselves conducting the investigation.  It is suggested that this can lead to 
inefficient investigations.  The Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina police department 
sought to increase integrity within their department by enlisting an outside review of their 
internal reviews department to identify and remove any factors that could lead to it 
working improperly (Klockars, et al., 2006).  External accountability measures can be 
critiqued because individuals outside of the department might not have the proper 
expertise to conduct such investigations.  Many departments are averse to being 
investigated externally because of fear the findings may tarnish the reputation of the 
department.  Despite the critiques of both measures they each present benefits to attaining 
information about corruption and promoting integrity.  
Police Accountability: Internal Mechanisms 
Recruitment 
 Police departments attempt to recruit the most qualified candidates to fulfill 
positions.  Different techniques are used to recruit these individuals including fliers, job 
fairs, meet and greets at local academic institutions, radio and television advertisement 
and even online recruitment.  A good recruitment pitch will appeal to a large audience 
and will inform them of the duties and responsibilities of the position.  The main role of 
recruitment is that it does not misinform potential candidates and reaches a diverse 
number of individuals.  Finally, recruitment officers should project an image of integrity 
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and professionalism so that potential recruits understand that these are the qualities that 
are prioritized by the department (Klockars, et al., 2006). 
Selection 
 Selection techniques differ across police departments but they are normally based 
upon a number of common factors including age, criminal history, military record, 
education and health (Caldero and Crank, 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006).  Furthermore 
some departments require that applicants pass academic and physical exams, an 
interview, credit check and drug test (White, 2007).  One of the initial tests of integrity in 
some police departments is a pre-employment polygraph exam.  All of these selection 
guidelines serve to achieve the purpose of preventing unqualified applicants from joining 
the force.  While attempting to create an environment of integrity and honor within the 
police force.   
Police Training 
 Effective training is the next step in the process of creating an honorable police 
department devoid of corruption (White and Escobar, 2008).  Police training seeks to 
provide the applicant with the basic skills, knowledge and expertise required to be a 
police officer.  This training includes in class training and on the job or in field training 
(Kappeler, et al., 1994).  The purpose of the in class training is to provide recruits with 
the knowledge of departmental and legal guidelines (Kelling, Wasserman, and Williams, 
1988).  The in field training provides recruits with the experience necessary to operate at 
their own discretions once they graduate from the academy.  It also initiates the 
socialization of an officer into the culture of the police department (Klockars et al., 
2006).  ―War stories‖ are taught to officers during their infield training and further their 
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initiation into the policing subculture (Caldero and Crank, 2004).  Proper training is 
important because it reduces the likelihood of errors that could result in misconduct. 
Supervision 
 Supervision in policing is different than nearly all other occupations because of 
the solitary nature of the policing profession.  Police interactions with the general public 
are normally guided by their own discretion (Kelling, et al., 1988).  Most officers only 
interact with their supervisors at the station house when they begin and end their shift or 
when they are filing a report.  Despite this supervisors play an important role in 
maintaining an environment of integrity within police departments (Engel, 2001).  They 
promote the ideals of the organization and ensure that officers do not deviate into corrupt 
behavior (Schafer & Martinelli, 2008).  Klockars et al., (2006) found that integrity was 
directly tied to the view and actual severity of punishment for officers who participated in 
corrupt activities.  In the three southern American police departments examined 
supervisors enforcing departmental guidelines increased the chances of maintaining an 
environment of integrity within the department. 
Administrative Guidance 
 These are the guidelines that form the parameters of police interactions with the 
public.  Guidelines have been a vital part of preventing misconduct since the inception of 
the first police department.  Knowledge and belief in these guidelines is a necessary 
component of maintaining an agency of integrity (Klockars, et al., 2006).  The problem is 
that at times an agencies official policy may be in conflict with the agencies unofficial 
policy.  This unofficial policy may be the result and encouraged by the subculture of 
policing (Klockars, et al., 2006). Another issue is that some departments will fail to 
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inform their officers of these guidelines or inform them of these guidelines improperly 
creating confusion among police officers (Klockars, et al., 2004).  Since discretion is a 
vital part of policing the lack of proper knowledge of these guidelines increases the 
chances of police misconduct occurring due to lack of direction in citizen interactions.  
Police legal advisors are a growing method of teaching administrative guidelines to 
departments.  Archbold (2006) found that police legal advisors have a crucial role in 
informing police management of changes in law influencing administrative guidelines.  
This results in a more informed police force and leads to reductions in civil liability cases 
related to corruption. 
Internal Affairs 
 Internal affairs bureaus have long been associated with misconduct within police 
departments (Goldstein, 1975).  It is the duty of an internal affairs bureau to monitor 
corruption within police departments and investigate any officers suspected of being 
involved in corrupt activities (Delattre, 2006).  Internal affairs bureaus work by gathering 
evidence from the public, co workers, planting moles within the department to report 
misconduct, and integrity test.  These tests involve examining whether potential or 
existing police officers when presented with an opportunity to participate in illicit and/or 
illegal activity will take advantage of the situation (Klockars, et al., 2006).   
Citizen reports of misconduct are a tool used by internal affairs to begin 
investigations.  The number of these reports has grown since anonymously and 
confidential reporting has been adopted by many departments (Klockars, et al., 2006).  
These different methods work to prevent or remove corrupt individuals from the police 
force increasing police integrity.  These all work to ensure that misconduct is not allowed 
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to operate impeded within a department.  The problem with internal affairs is that they 
are highly influenced by those who work in the unit.  Relationships with officers outside 
the unit can affect investigations and in some cases can lead to corruption within the 
internal affairs unit itself (Kappeler, et al., 1994). 
Early Warning Systems 
 Early warning systems are a recent phenomenon that attempt to prevent serious 
police misconduct.  These systems collect information on officers within a department 
and flag any officer who exhibits the signs of possibly being a disciplinary issue using 
quantitative information to analyze them (Walker, 2007).  Items utilized within an early 
warning system include use of force data, citizen complaint reports, problematic behavior 
reports and other factors that vary across departments (Bucak, 2009; Lersh, Bazley and 
Mieczkowski, 2006).  The types of factors and number of factors collected by early 
warning systems vary by department with no universal system existing (Bazley, 
Mieczkowski and Lersch, 2009).  The system operates on the belief that officers who 
participate in corruption are likely to exhibit early warning signs that if unchecked will 
lead to crimes of more severity (Sherman, 1985).  They are based on the belief that if 
caught early, officers could be reformed to prevent future corruption and furthering the 
environment of integrity within departments.  
Changing the Subculture 
The policing subculture has long been cited as the main factor motivating an 
environment of corruption within departments.  It can be argued that this subculture 
developed in the aftermath of the Professional Policing model established by Vollmer in 
the 1920s (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).  Specifically, the aggressive policing style and 
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solitary nature of this traditional policing model led to the subculture which many feel is 
responsible for corruption within departments.  It has been found that officers across 
decades continually join the force for the betterment of society and to help people (Foley, 
Guarneri, & Kelly, 2008).  Despite this finding the subculture has been an ever present 
part of policing.  This has only added to the need to reform the policing style (Micucci & 
Gomme, 2005). 
Community policing is the new policing model that has been created to help in the 
removal of this subculture of policing.  Specifically, there is more emphasis placed on 
communication with the community, more attention given to non-crime control duties of 
policing such as problem solving and a more proactive rather than reactive approach to 
societal problems (Micucci & Gomme, 2005).  Changing to a community policing model 
is a time consuming process because of needs to reform the recruitment, training and 
organizational structure of policing to properly follow the model.  However, it is a vital 
step in helping to change and remove the policing subculture. 
The central role of the Chief 
 The chief is the person in charge of a department and creates the atmosphere that 
is to be followed by officers under his power.  It has been argued that the police chief 
influences not only the style within their department but whether their department is one 
of integrity or corruption (Skolnick, 2008).  If the chief maintains an environment of 
strict discipline they will increase the chance of maintaining integrity.  But if the chief 
does not hold officers accountable he is created an environment where misconduct and 
corruption will flourish.  Klockars et al., (2006) found that in Charleston, South Carolina 
the long tenured police chief played a vital role in creating a department of integrity.  He 
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was aware of all activity in his department and aimed to eliminate the code of silence that 
is common in most departments.  To reach this goal he provided incentives for officers to 
report the misconduct of fellow officers and severely disciplined officers that protected 
the corrupt activities of others within this department.  The chief understood the 
importance of first line officers and their assistance in preventing instances of corruption 
(Klockars, et al., 2006).  This method of fear and control created an environment where 
there was no or little support for the police subculture eliminating the corruption that is 
normally associated with it (Klockars, et al., 2006).   
Police Accountability: External Mechanisms 
Criminal Law: Prosecuting the police 
 Officers are not above the law and should be punished the same as normal citizens 
if they violate the law.  Police participate in a number of activities that are in violation of 
the law in the performance of their duties.  The law allows this as necessary however 
some officers participate in crimes outside the guidelines of their duties.  For this they 
must be punished.  Prosecuting police that participate in corruption is a means of the 
justice system promoting an environment of integrity and strengthens the justice system 
entirely (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).  It provides a message to the community and police 
that corruption no matter the occupation is unacceptable in a society of integrity. 
Civil Litigation: Suing the police 
 Police officers are given a duty to protect the general public.  If they fail to 
perform this duty because they are negligent or because they use their position for 
personal gain they should be held responsible.  Civil litigation is a method of holding 
police responsible but it is different from criminal prosecution because police 
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departments are held financially responsible for the actions of their officers (Kappeler et 
al., 1994).  Suing the police sends a message that their corrupt activities will not be 
accepted by the general public.  In the aftermath of civil litigation reforms are normally 
instituted in departments to remove the factors that led to the behavior responsible for 
corruption.  This can include firing officers and supervision, creating new methods of 
oversight or completely overhauling the department structure (Scolnick and Fyfe, 1993). 
Judicial Intervention 
 The courts influence how the police interact with the general public.  The due 
process revolution of the 1960s is probably the best example of this as it completely 
overhauled the rights provided to citizens in their interactions with police (Walker, 1999).  
The courts have continued to intervene on the part of citizens in holding police 
accountable for their actions.  By doing this the courts continue to protect the rights of 
citizens while upholding and maintaining the standards of integrity in police departments.  
By holding these departments accountable for their actions it serves notice that police are 
not above the law (Scolnick and Fyfe, 1993).  
Special Investigations 
 Commissions occur when the local, state or federal government mandates an 
investigation into activities occurring within a police department.  These commissions 
normally are appointed by government leaders and they seek to investigate a department 
through a complex process involving witnesses, evidence and experts (White, 2007).  
These commissions have been at the forefront of bringing attention to the issue of 
corruption in many police departments across the nations (Knapp Commission, 1972; 
Mollen Commission, 1994).  They normally produce comprehensive reports examining 
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misconduct on the part of police and the reforms that could be instituted to remove 
factors leading to this corruption.  
U.S. Department of Justice Consent Decrees 
 Consent decrees are agreements that normally occur in the aftermath of litigation 
(Kupferberg, 2008).  These agreements are normally between a police department and the 
DOJ.  They create guidelines that are to be placed on a police department requiring that a 
number of initiatives occur to prevent further litigation.  Although corruption does not 
have to be a central focus of decrees it is normally a part of them (Kupferberg, 2008).  
The guidelines placed forth in a decree attempt to create reforms that aim to eliminate the 
problems within police departments.  Failure to follow these decrees can result in 
increased oversight and discipline for departments (Schafer & Martinelli, 2008; Caldero 
and Crank, 2004). 
Citizen Oversight 
 The common factors missing from many of the methods of police accountability 
is input from the citizenry (Kappeler, et al., 1994).  It is argued that the individuals that 
are being affected by corruption are the best to provide feedback to police on issues 
related to corruption.  The main concern of citizen oversight committees is to ensure that 
the public has a role in police accountability (Walker, 2007).  Having the public involved 
in the accountability process can reduce the secrecy normally associated with the police.  
The erosion of this secrecy can increase public confidence in policing and the justice 
system as a whole (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).  
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Public Interest Groups, the Media, and the Public 
 All of these serve the same purpose of keeping the public informed of police 
activities.  They bring attention to issues that in the past would have been kept secret.  
The main thing they aim to do is hold the police accountable to the public they serve.  
The intense attention that results because of these organizations bring attention to corrupt 
behavior often leads to reforms more quickly than is possible with other accountability 
techniques (Bucak, 2009; Kappeler, et al., 1994; Warren & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2009). 
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Integrity Research 
Research studies have attempted to examine the issue of corruption but it is a field 
of research which has a multitude of measurement issues which make directly studying 
corruption difficult (Bucak, 2009; Klockars et al., 2000; Skogan & Meares, 2004).  Most 
corrupt transactions involve parties that would rather not identify their involvement in 
this activity.  Victims of corruption normally refuse to report these activities because of 
fear of reprisal and police officers do not want to break the camaraderie with their fellow 
officers (Klockars, et al., 2006).  This creates issues as it pertains to data analysis because 
there is no official or reliable source for corruption data (Ivkovich, 2002; Klockars et al., 
2006).  Since this data source does not exist there is a need to attain data from alternative 
sources. 
Alternate sources of data normally used in criminal justice research such as 
victimization and self-report surveys also present their own validity concerns.  Most 
departments refuse to participate in studies examining corruption because fear of self 
incrimination (Klockars, et al., 2006).  Police administrators do not want to be associated 
with corruption research because of the negative impression of the department that may 
result if corruption is found within the department (Ward and McCormack, 1979).  Even 
if they agree to participate in studies most police officers will refuse to break the blue 
wall of silence which leads to validity concerns with any data collected (Klockars, et al., 
2006).  
 Understanding the difficulty that came with researching police corruption, 
Klockars, C., et al, (2000) decided to take a new approach to corruption research.  
Adopting the police integrity approach first suggested at the COP/NIJ conference 
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(Gaffigan & McDonald, 1997; Klockars, et al., 2006).  At the conference the COPS/NIJ 
team decided to eliminate the use of the word corruption and implementing the word 
―integrity‖ (Gaffigan & McDonald, 1997; Klockars, et al, 2006).  The adoption of this 
approach had a number of advantages.  There are many negative stigmas associated with 
using the word corruption by replacing it with the less negative term of integrity 
researchers made investigating this issue more amenable to police administrators and 
unions (Klockars, et al., 2006).  Another advantage of the use of the term integrity is it 
can be used to explain activities of individuals, organizations and any group police can be 
assigned (e.g. community districts, precincts) (Klockars, et al., 2006).  This can be used 
by researchers to provide comprehensive analysis across all levels of a police 
organization.  In addition, the decision to adopt the use of the term integrity was 
supported by both researchers and practitioners (Klockars, et al., 2006).   
Klockars, et al., (2000) defined ―Police Integrity as the normative inclination 
among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation‖ 
(Klockars, et al., 2006; 1).  The definition aims to include both micro (individual) and 
macro (precinct, departmental) levels of the police organization.  The definition also 
includes all types of abusive police behavior, avoiding the issues that accompany the lack 
of a universally agreed upon definition of corruption and its associated crimes (Klockars, 
et al., 2006).  The Klockars, et al., (2000) study on police integrity was a seminal piece in 
the field of policing because it was one of the first studies that examined the topic from 
this new and innovative approach.  Corruption and integrity share a relationship where 
the presence of more integrity means that less corruption will exist.  By examining 
integrity Klockars, et al., (2000) were able to examine corruption indirectly.  The 
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presumption of the research was that the indirect study of corruption was more amenable 
to honest response and openness on the part of participants when compared to earlier 
corruption research which has long been critiqued for validity concerns (Klockars et al., 
2006).  Another advantage of this view point is that by using the organizational approach 
it allows officers‘ to simply examine responses in the research tool to understand the 
factors affecting integrity and implement administrative responses to reform these 
problems (Klockars, et al., 2000). 
In their study Klockars, et al., (2000) distributed their integrity survey to 30 police 
departments across the United States.  They collected nearly 3,300 surveys from these 
different agencies.  They found that the more serious a behavior, the more willing officers 
were to report this behavior.  Officers were more likely to recommend stricter 
disciplinary action if they viewed a behavior as more serious.  Officers also supported the 
recommended discipline in the survey as it related to most of the cases.  Despite this the 
study found support for the blue wall of silence within many departments in the United 
States as  most officers were unwilling to report less serious violations by colleagues. 
Klockars et al. (2004) using the earlier collected data from the United States 
decided with the assistance of other researchers to examine the issue of integrity from a 
cross-cultural perspective.  Their integrity survey was distributed internationally across 
14 countries with minor revisions made to address cultural differences in the cases.  They 
found that as it pertains to the rank order of evaluated seriousness of misconduct for the 
11 cases nearly all 14 countries included in the study were similar.  However, there were 
some offenses that were ranked differently across these nations, this included ―case 8, the 
cover up of a police DUI (driving under the influence) and minor accident‖ which was 
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ranked among the least serious in some nations while it was marked as the most serious 
offense in others (Klockars, et al., 2004; 13).  ―Case 10, which involves the use of 
excessive force on a car thief‖ also had different levels of seriousness responses across 
nations (Klockars, et al., 2004; 13).  The differences appear to be directly tied to cultural 
views for driving under the influence and brutality respectively within the nations. 
Overall, the nations were similar in the ordering of the ―three measures of 
integrity—seriousness, discipline, and willingness to report‖ (Klockars, et al., 2004; 13).  
Willingness to report was found to be the measure with the most deviation across the 
nations.  This directly ties to the blue wall of silence and its cross cultural role in these 
police departments.  Across these nations it appears that the expected severity of 
punishment for an offense is related to the view of severity by police officers (Klockars, 
et al., 2004).  Indeed most officers‘ especially young ones were willing to overlook minor 
offenses even if they were against guidelines of a department.  In spite of this when it 
came to more serious offenses it was universally reported by officers of all ages 
(Klockars, et al., 2004).  This was the most alarming finding from this study because it 
proved that the blue wall of silence was a worldwide issue affecting decision making and 
not solely restricted to the United States. 
 Newham (2002) examined integrity within the Hillbrow Police Station in South 
Africa.  Using the integrity survey developed by Klockars, et al. (2000) he surveyed over 
100 officers in the department.  The study found strong support for the blue wall of 
silence.  Most respondents believed that their colleagues would not report participation in 
misconduct such as those in the cases.  An additional survey examining integrity found 
that most line managers refused to report misconduct for fear of reprisal and because they 
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did not want to affect the reputation of the department (Newham, 2002).  Chan (2003) 
found that most officers were quickly socialized into the policing subculture.  They were 
exposed to the informal rules of the departments which required them to not report illicit 
behaviors of colleagues unless the behavior was serious.  The impact of reporting such 
behavior was normally reprisal from others within the department. 
Huberts, Lamboo & Punch (2003) conducted a comparison study of integrity in 
the Netherlands and the United States.  They found that Dutch police officers were 
stricter than their American counterparts as it came to rating the cases in the Klockars et 
al. (2000) integrity survey.  A notable finding of this study was that the case involved the 
accepting of free gifts was considered much more serious by Dutch officer than it was by 
American officers.  The Dutch were also more willing to report the activities of their 
colleagues when compared to counterparts in the United States.  This alludes to the 
possibility that cultural norms of acceptance for corrupt behavior in the United States are 
directly tied to the stronger blue wall of silence.  This finding of less severe views of 
integrity issues in the United States was supported by Ekenvall (2003) in his cross 
cultural comparison of integrity among Swedish, American and Croatian police forces.  
He found that Swedish police were stricter in their views of integrity issues when 
compared to both their American and Croatian counterparts. 
Alain (2004) examined integrity in Quebec police officers using the Klockars, et 
al. (2000) integrity survey.  He found that younger officers in Quebec were less likely to 
report less serious cases from the integrity survey.  It appears the longer an individual 
remains within the department the more likely they are to enforce the official policies of 
that department.  Support for the ―blue wall of silence‖ was also found by Westmarland 
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(2005).  Behaviors associated with noble cause corruption were more likely to be privy to 
the ―blue wall of silence‖, while personal gains corruption was often not privy to the 
―blue wall of silence‖.  Indicating that the subculture of policing is deliberate in the types 
of crimes it supports and does not support. 
Ivkovich (2005) examined integrity across three countries (e.g. Croatia, Finland 
and United States) using the Klockars, et al., (2000) integrity survey.  The study had a 
sample of both supervisors and line officers.  She found that supervisors rated cases more 
seriously than line officers.  This finding would later be supported by Schafer & 
Martinelli (2008).  Supervisors were especially stricter in their views, when compared to 
line officers as it pertained to the less severe cases of misconduct. 
Schafer & Martinelli (2008) examined integrity in first-line supervisors in the 
Sunnyville Police Department.  The study replicated the earlier Klockars et al. (2000) 
examination of police integrity but utilized a sample of supervisors instead of line 
officers as the sample population.  Their study found that in comparison to the earlier 
Klockars, et al. (2000) study his sample rated the cases with more severity especially 
when it came to low and mid level cases.  Female and African American respondents in 
his sample viewed the cases more seriously and were more likely to report the cases in 
comparison to the rest of his sample (Schafer & Martinelli, 2008). 
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Research Tool 
 Klockars et al., (2000) created a research tool to examine police integrity through 
an organizational approach otherwise known in the literature as rotten orchard/barrel 
theory.  They utilized this approach because it allows for an indirect examination of the 
topic of corruption that is less likely to encounter resistance.  By making inquiries that are 
from an organizational approach rather than an individual approach, officers will be more 
willing to be honest with their responses increasing the validity of the study (Klockars, et 
al., 2000; Klockars, et al, 2006).  Specifically, officers will feel that they are giving 
insight into the factors that influence integrity within an organization rather than 
providing information on fellow officers that participate in corrupt activities.  Also 
examining the issue from an organizational approach makes it more amenable to study 
than examining from the individual approach which normally ties into issues of morality 
that are more difficult to examine (Klockars, et al., 2006).   
To examine this issue a quantitative survey was created that presented questions 
which are the foundation of integrity in any department.  This tool has proven to be 
useful in a number of different research studies (Ekenvall, 2003; Klockars, et al., 2000; 
Klockars, et al., 2004; Newham, 2002; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008).  It has been even 
been used successfully in police departments outside the United States allowing for cross 
cultural comparison (Ivkovich, 2005; Newham, 2002; Schafer & Martinelli, 2008).  The 
survey provides officers with 11 hypothetical case scenarios and asks respondents to 
respond to the case scenarios by answering 7 questions (see Appendix B and C). Six of 
these questions were designed to assess the normative inclination of police to resist 
temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation. The remaining question 
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asked respondents whether the behavior described in the scenario was a violation of the 
agency‘s official policy.  Specifically, the questions seek to examine the seriousness, 
discipline and willingness to report the misconduct cases.  To ensure the validity of 
responses officers were asked to respond to two additional questions at the end of the 
survey.  These were questions asking if participants felt colleagues would answer the 
survey honestly and if they themselves had answered the questions honestly.  Those who 
respond that they did not answer questions honestly had their surveys discarded 
(Klockars, et al., 2000).  
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Research Foundation 
 The literature review leads to a number of research questions and hypotheses that 
will be examined by the researcher.  These research questions are based on the view that 
a police organization is responsible for the activity both positive, and negative, within 
their departments.  The police subculture is a major source of concern within the 
literature.  It is considered by many researchers to be the major influence of integrity 
within departments.  This research will base all hypotheses on 3 prongs that have been 
identified as being influences of the police subculture.  These include changes in police 
training, increases in police accountability measures and changes in policing model from 
traditional policing to community policing model. 
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Research is never a simple undertaking especially as it relates to Criminal Justice 
issues.  The importance of gathering data for research is paramount in any project. 
Attempting to conduct research with specific groups especially as it relates to 
controversial topics such as corruption and integrity is difficult.  This was the task placed 
upon the researchers to complete this project. 
As the project began there was an understanding of the difficulties that come with 
researching a close knit and protective group like law enforcement (Klockars et al., 
2000).  As Klockars et al., (2000) discovered examining police comes with a number of 
validity concerns that this project sought to avoid.  Replicating the seminal Klockars et 
al., (2000) study provided the best opportunity for examining this group.  Using the 
remaining contacts that Dr. Haberfeld had within these agencies we identified ten 
agencies.  These departments were sent correspondent letters identifying ourselves and 
the intensions of the project.  Out of these ten agencies which were deemed most likely to 
participate in the research only 2 responded with approval for participation.  The research 
went forward based upon the guidelines set forth in the proposal.   
This project used both quantitative and qualitative methods to gather data.  This 
two fold process involved surveys and informal interviews.  We held informal interviews 
to discuss the research instrument with a small group of officers at each agency that 
participated in the research.  These interviews lasted from one to two hours providing 
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feedback on the research instrument and giving insight into the culture of integrity at each 
department.  Notes were collected during these informal discussions with each 
department.  After the informal interviews were conducted the surveys were handed out 
to contacts at each respective agency.  Agency 1 received 70 surveys and returned 45 
completed (64%), while Agency 2 received 160 surveys and returned 45 completed 
(28%), and Agency 3 received about 45 surveys and returned 25 completed (55%).  
Surveys were then collected by the researcher at a later date.  With surveys 
collected from each department in a relatively timely matter and with a good success rate. 
Despite the initial rejection on the part of many agencies the researchers sought to 
gather information from a third agency in hopes of increasing the sample size.  We 
identified an additional 4 to 5 agencies participated in the original study but with whom 
Dr. Haberfeld no longer had contacts within the agencies.  Letters were sent to these 
agencies inquiring about participation in the research.  One agency replied with interest in 
participating in the project.  Plans were then made to meet with officers at this agency for 
the informal interview and to discuss how the surveys would be completed by officers. 
These initial meeting went well and the agency seemed particularly excited about 
participation in the research.  This agency is well known for their participation in 
research and environment of integrity.  These factors were ever present during the initial 
meetings and informal interviews.  We left the informal meetings about the survey with a 
plan to distribute the surveys electronically on the website to increase our number of 
surveys collected.  This optimism would soon turn to disappointment as the controversial 
nature of the research would give the police chief ―cold feet‖ and cause him to pull out of 
the research project. 
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Numerous attempts were made to allay the concerns of the department but they 
proved fruitless.  ―Cold feet‖ are a part of criminal justice research especially as it relates 
to police officers.  Without the approval of the complete department hierarchy we are 
unable to conduct research.  Newham (2002) encountered similar refusal from managers 
to participate in the study for fear of affecting the reputation of the department.  Punch 
(1989) pointed towards how increased resistance comes from the policing organization as 
news of your research project travels through the organization.  Controversial issues such 
as integrity/corruption research make it ever more difficult to conduct research.  There 
are truly restrictions placed on researchers based upon the whims of departments 
(Klockars, et al., 2006; Skogan & Meares, 2004). 
At this point my dissertation supervisor and member of the original research team 
that examined police integrity, Maki Haberfeld took control of attaining a third group to 
participate in the research.  She identified a training facility which was involved with a 
number of the agencies that participated in the original research.  Through this facility 
she was able to distribute and collect the final group of surveys that would represent the 
third new group on our research study. 
The research sample consisted of N = 116 police officers at three different 
agencies.  This sample includes both line officers and supervisors across all participating 
police departments.  The police departments are departments from the northeast of the 
United States.  All information on participants and police departments that participate in 
the study will be kept confidential.  There was no any unique identifier information for 
participants. 
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The comparison group for this dataset consisted of a sample of N = 117 police officers 
at two different agencies.  These agencies corresponded with two of the three agencies for 
which data was collected from for the current research sample.  This data was retrieved from 
the dataset used in the original Klockars et al study.  Since the third agency used in the new 
dataset was a training facility and not specific agency there was no corresponding data from 
the original study for comparison. The sample breakdown for the agencies in the current 
dataset was Agency one (N = 45), Agency two (N = 45), Agency three (N = 26).  The 
sample breakdown for the data from the original dataset was Agency one (N = 37) and 
Agency two (N = 80).  Although limited in sample size it was sufficient to provide a 
reliable view of the nature of the culture of policing at least among these agencies. 
Agency # # of surveys 
Agency 1 Current dataset 45 
Agency 2 Current dataset 45 
Agency 3 Current dataset 26 
Agency 1 Original dataset 37 




 Informal interviews took place at two of the three departments where surveys 
were distributed.  Due to constraints within agency three there were no informal 
interviews conducted at this location.  The informal interviews served to improve the 
survey instrument and provided insight into the culture within the departments.  The 
researchers would like to thank those that participated in these interview sessions as their 
insight was invaluable in improving the research tool and proving an understanding of the 
policing environment at their respective departments (see appendices A, B, C and E).  
The interview at agency one took place with six officers and lasted nearly two 
hours.  At agency two nearly fifteen officers participated in the interviews and the 
process only lasted about an hour.  The officers at both agencies seemed very open about 
their feelings on the cases.  Below are comparisons by case scenario of the discussions 
that took place. 
Case one was agreed upon by officers at both departments as not being serious.  
At agency one the officers made a number of comments to back their viewpoints as to 
why this is acceptable.  They stated: 
―what you do in your private time is your private time‖ 
―As long as you are not committing a crime or taking away from your job‖ 
―As long as you are not recognized as a police officer‖ 
The officers at agency one went on to explain that if you were not certain you should 
contact the police chief.  They stated that most of these rules come from ―common sense‖ 
but that if necessary you should refer to the regulations of your department. 
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 Agency two was very similar to agency one in recognizing case one as not being a 
major violation.  The only issue noted by officers at agency two was an explicit rule 
which banned officer participation any location with a liquor license ―no matter what‖.  
This included working at bars or locations where liquor may be served.  Since this was 
noted a number of times it appeared to be of utmost importance to officers at this agency.  
Most officers felt that this type of case was learned with experience ―as most officers did 
not know something was wrong‖ until they or others were disciplined for doing it. 
 Case two was similar to the first in officers viewpoints expressed.  They felt that 
this was not a major violation as long as it was evenly distributed across all levels of the 
department.  It was not something meant to be individualized because ―it then could bring 
trouble‖.  An interesting thing to note with case two as it applied to members of agency 
two was the belief that rules also applied to family member of officers.  They stated that 
this was an issue at their department that had been discussed with officers to avoid issues.  
It brought into consideration the interesting dynamic of integrity among not only officers 
but their family members. 
 Case three involved an officer accepting a bribe from a motorist and was equally 
deemed inappropriate and unacceptable by officers at both agencies.  Case four was a 
more individualized version of case two but was equally viewed as being inappropriate at 
both agencies unless all officers at an agency were equally given gifts as mentioned in the 
case.  Cases five was similar to case three in that officers at both agencies viewed it as 
being inappropriate and unacceptable. 
 Case six was viewed as being appropriate as long as an officer did not accept 
the gratuity on the ―back end‖.  However this was not universal as some officers at 
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agency one felt that under no circumstance should an officer be allowed to recommend a 
service to citizens.  Those officers at agency two were not as strict in their viewpoint of 
an officer referral of service.  Case seven sparked debate at both departments.  Most 
officers viewed it as being a ―case by case‖ basis as to whether the behavior was 
acceptable.  At agency one, the officers continually referred to an officer that was part of 
the ―old guard‖.  He was an officer that was known to be involved in this activity but his 
actions were viewed as being acceptable because he was the ―old guard‖.  They 
mentioned that his actions normally took advantage of the skills mentioned in this case 
and was unacceptable for anyone other than himself to take advantage of within the 
department. 
 Case eight involved a drunk driving incident where no one was hurt but the 
person involved was a police officer.  In the case the officer is assisted by a fellow officer 
and the incident is not reported.  This case brought about the most disparity of all the 
cases because some officers felt it was wrong to assist the person even if they were an 
officer.  There were others in both departments that felt ―you help a brother out‖ if 
possible ―as long as there are no consequences‖ for you.  It was an interesting dynamic 
on display at both departments. 
 Case nine involved an officer receiving alcohol as payment for letting a bar 
remain open.  Those at agency two stated this was unacceptable, while those at agency 
one referred once again to the fact that ―they left‖ implying that this activity was 
acceptable for certain individuals.  They mentioned how these individuals belonged to a 
different generation at the department but that this was no longer accepted now that said 
person has departed the organization. 
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 Case ten involved a case of excessive force which officer at both departments 
believed was acceptable as a means of protecting one self.  Officers at agency one stated 
―they do what they have to do to make sure they get home‖ while those at agency two 
stated that the activity is fine as long as ―it ends once the person is arrested‖.  Finally, 
case eleven was viewed as being serious by most at both departments even though a 
small handful at agency two felt it was acceptable to take the money if there was no one 
easily identified as the owner of the property. 
 During these discussions a number of facts were brought up about each respective 
agency.  Officers at both agencies referred to pedagogy as the dominant training style 
during their academy training.  All officers agreed with not identifying their date of 
beginning service.  They felt the presidential timeline used as an estimate of date of 
service would assist in honesty of service.  The officers referred to releases of 
confidential documents to the general public at both departments as being indicative of 
how difficult it is to maintain anonymity when self-identifying information is involved. 
 Agency 1 had a continuing training program that was mostly for incoming and 
relatively new officers.  While agency 2 had no continuing training program, despite this 
officers‘ at agency 2 mentioned that if continued training was offered they would be 
likely to take advantage of it.  Community policing was deemed the type of model 
promoted at both departments even though officers at Agency 1 felt this was just to 
appease the public and that to them the department promoted more of a problem solving 
approach. 
 No early warning system was instituted at the departments as far as the officers 
knew.  They did recognize however that if one was in place they would not know how it 
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would work and that it would likely not influence their activities.  Finally, officers at both 
agencies referred to their family history as influencing their choice of profession and how 
they adjusted to the police force.  At both agencies officers discussed how they were 
more adept to understand the dynamic of the policing culture because they had learned it 
from family members that were members of the force.  This variable would later be 
implemented into the analysis (see table 13.1 to 13.6). 
 58 
Hypotheses 
H1: Officers will judge the cases more seriously than the officers in the earlier 
Klockars, et al. (2000) study 
H2: Officers will recommend misconduct be punished more severely than the 
officers in the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study 
H3: Officers will be more willing to agree with departmental guidelines for 
discipline than the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study 
H4: Willingness to report misconduct has increased among officers surveyed 
when compared to the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study 
H5: Officers will report that their colleagues are more willing to report misconduct 
when compared to the earlier Klockars, et al. (2000) study 
H6: Officers with current knowledge of departmental guidelines will rate cases 
higher for seriousness, discipline and willingness to report 
H7: Officers with a longer length of service will rate the cases higher for 
seriousness, discipline and willingness to report 
H8: Supervisors will rate the cases more seriously than line officers 
H9: Supervisors will recommend more severe discipline than line officers 
H10: Supervisors will be more willing to report misconduct than line officers 
H11: Pedagogy training will be positively associated with the code of silence  
H12: Lack of in-service training will be positively associated with the code of 
silence 
H13: Lack of participation in police accountability measures will be positively 
associated with the code of silence 
H14: Traditional policing model will be negatively associated with the code of 
silence within departments 
H15: Those officers with family members in policing will be more likely to 
participate in the code of silence within departments 





Hypotheses 1 through 5 were aimed to illuminate and replicate the foundations of 
the earlier Klockars, et al., (2000) research study.  Specifically, these hypotheses will 
measure seriousness, discipline and willingness to report.  Over the last hundred years 
there has cyclically been a major corruption scandal at a nationally recognized police 
agency every 15 to 20 years and this is the time span that has passed since the original 
study.  Changes in these research measures could be indicative of changes in the policing 
environments.  By comparing the scores on these measures across the new departments 
and their corresponding older data we can examine this issue. 
Hypothesis 6 will examine the influence that departmental guidelines have in the 
case scores.  Klockars, et al., (2006) pointed towards knowledge and belief in 
departmental guidelines being influential in maintaining an environment of integrity.  
This hypothesis will examine the impact that this had within these departments as it 
relates to the cases.  Hypothesis 7 will examine whether officer length of service will 
result in higher case scores.  Length of service was a variable added after the informal 
interviews as many officers pointed towards experiences on the job influences how they 
would view a number of the cases from the survey instrument. 
Hypotheses 8 through 10 will examine differences across the two major groups in 
policing, the line officer and supervisor as it relates to the previously noted measures.  
The literature has pointed towards differences in the viewpoints across these groups as it 
relates to integrity related issues (Ivkovich, 2005; Schafer & Martinelli, (2008).  This will 
attempt to examine this issue within the departments studied as it relates to the previously 
mentioned measures. 
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Hypothesis 11 to 14 will examine 3 prongs that have been identified as being 
influences of the police subculture and integrity across the departments (Klockars, et al., 
2000).  These include changes in police training, increases in police accountability 
measures and changes in policing model.  The researcher hypothesizes that these factors 
will influences changes across the measures especially as it relates to the ―code of 
silence‖ relevant questions.   
Hypothesis 15 was added after the informal interviews and points towards 
previous family experience with employment in the police force influencing views on 
―the code of silence‖.  Officers mentioned that familial experience with the ―code of 
silence‖ had influenced their decision to participate in the ―code of silence‖ upon joining 
the force.  It appeared that at least initially upon joining the force, most of these officers 
understood that participation in the ―code of silence‖ was a part of the process that comes 
with joining the force.  These hypotheses will give insight into how changes implemented 
have helped or deterred integrity issues over the past 15 years.   
Hypothesis 16 will replicate the foundations of the earlier Klockars, et al., (2000) 
research study.  Specifically, these hypotheses will measure seriousness, discipline and 
willingness to report across the new departments solely.  Differences across these 





This study attempts to examine the culture of policing by examining the integrity 
measures created by Klockars et al., (2000).  In addition a number of variables across the 
prongs identified will be tested.  These variables are explained further below. 
Independent variables 
 Independent variables include the departments, police training techniques, 
policing model and police accountability measures.  These variables were deemed 
suitable for analysis based upon both the literature and the informal interviews that took 
place.  These will give insight into changes and impacts that they may have on the 
environment of policing (see table 1.1) 
Dependent variables 
 The research tool created by Klockars, et al., (2000) will serve as the dependent 
variable in this study.  The research tool contains seven questions to eleven cases that 
examine seriousness, discipline and willingness to report.  The answers to these questions 
will give insight to the environment of policing and the impact of changes implemented 
in the aftermath of the original research study (see table 2.1 to 2.11) 
 To fit the assumption that no more than 20% of the categories must have expected 
frequencies of less than 5 for chi-square analysis the dependent variable had to be 
recoded.  This recoding created new categories which still measured the variables 




Table 1.1: Independent variables 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
RECODEPD Recoded police department 
DGUIDELINESRECODE  Often department updates changes admin guidelines 
RECODEPRESIDENT Length of service according to presidential timeline 
POSITION Position within police department 
ACADEMY TRAINING Describe majority of academy training 
POSTCONTRAINING Required post academy or continuing training 
EARLYWARNINGSYSTEM Does department have early warning system 
DEPARTMENTPOLICEMODEL Police model believe your department mostly follow 
POLICEFAMILY Family member officer prior to joining the force 





Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs 
security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty 
hours. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NBUSINOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NBUSINMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NBUSINVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NBUSINOD Discipline should receive 
NBUSINMD Discipline would receive 
NBUSINOR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small 
value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to 
abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NMEALSOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NMEALSMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NMEALSVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NMEALSOD Discipline should receive 
NMEALSMD Discipline would receive 
NMEALSOR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a 
personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NSPEEDOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NSPEEDMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NSPEEDVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NSPEEDOD Discipline should receive 
NSPEEDMD Discipline would receive 
NSPEEDOR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local 
merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by 
giving him gifts of food and liquor. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NHOLIOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NHOLIMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NHOLIVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NHOLIOD Discipline should receive 
NHOLIMD Discipline would receive 
NHOLIOR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are 
smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he 
takes a watch, worth about 2 days‘ pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had 
been stolen during the burglary. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NBURGOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NBURGMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NBURGVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NBURGOD Discipline should receive 
NBURGMD Discipline would receive 
NBURGOR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer 
the owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he 
receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NAUTOOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NAUTOMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NAUTOVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NAUTOOD Discipline should receive 
NAUTOMD Discipline would receive 
NAUTOOR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to 
work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees 
to tune up his supervisor‘s personal car. Evaluate the supervisor’s behavior. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NSUPEROS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NSUPERMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NSUPERVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NSUPEROD Discipline should receive 
NSUPERMD Discipline would receive 
NSUPEROR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 8. At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a 
deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. 
He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously 
intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this 
accident and offense, he transports the driver to his home. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NALCHOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NALCHMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NALCHVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NALCHOD Discipline should receive 
NALCHMD Discipline would receive 
NALCHOR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past 
its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to 
accept a couple of free drinks from the owner. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NBAROS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NBARMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NBARVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NBAROD Discipline should receive 
NBARMD Discipline would receive 
NBAROR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break 
into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before 
apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under 
control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for 
fleeing and resisting. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NFORCEOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NFORCEMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NFORCEVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NFORCEOD Discipline should receive 
NFORCEMD Discipline would receive 
NFORCEOR Own willingness to report behavior 




Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money 
equivalent to a full day‘s pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property 
but keeps the money for himself. 
Variable Name Variable Meaning 
NWALLETOS Own view of seriousness for behavior 
NWALLETMS Others view of seriousness of behavior 
NWALLETVI Was behavior a Violation of Policy 
NWALLETOD Discipline should receive 
NWALLETMD Discipline would receive 
NWALLETOR Own willingness to report behavior 
NWALLETMR Others willingness to report behavior 
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Table 3.1:  Own seriousness of behavior was originally rated on 5 part likert scale 




5 Very serious 
 
It was recoded to become 
1 + 2 -> 1 Not Serious 
3 + 4+ 5 -> 2 Serious 
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Table 3.2: Others seriousness of behavior was originally rated on 5 part likert scale 




5 Very serious 
 
It was recoded to become 
1 + 2 -> 1 Not Serious 
3 + 4+ 5 -> 2 Serious 
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Table 3.3: Violation of Policy was originally rated on a 5 part likert scale 




5 Definitely Yes 
 
It was recoded to become 
1 + 2 ->1 No violation of policy 
3->2 Unsure 
4+5-> 3 Violation of policy 
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Table 3.4: Discipline should receive was originally rated on a 6 part likert scale 
1 None 
2 Verbal Reprimand 
3 Written Reprimand 
4 Period of suspension with no pay 
5 Demotion in rank 
6 Dismissal 
 
It was recoded to become 
1 + 2 -> 1 No reprimand 
3 + 4-> 2 Moderate reprimand 
5 + 6 -> 3 Serious reprimand 
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Table 3.5: Discipline would receive was originally rated on a 6 part likert scale 
1 None 
2 Verbal Reprimand 
3 Written Reprimand 
4 Period of suspension with no pay 
5 Demotion in rank 
6 Dismissal 
 
It was recoded to become 
1 + 2 -> 1 No reprimand 
3 + 4-> 2 Moderate reprimand 
5 + 6 -> 3 Serious reprimand 
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Table 3.6: Own willingness to report was originally rated on a 5 part likert scale 




5 Definitely Yes 
 
It was recoded to become 
1 + 2 ->1 No 
3->2 Unsure 
4+5-> 3 Yes 
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Table 3.7: Others willingness to report was originally rated on a 5 part likert scale 




5 Definitely Yes 
 
It was recoded to become 
1 + 2 ->1 No 
3->2 Unsure 
4+5-> 3 Yes 
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Techniques of Analyses 
A number of descriptive and inferential techniques were used to analyze the 
survey data collected.  In the Klockars, et al. study (2000), mean scores were created for 
the survey results on police officers‘ perceptions of offense seriousness, appropriate and 
expected discipline and willingness to report, ranked by officers perception of case 
seriousness.  This was done for the eleven cases and the cases were then ranked to 
determine the case ranking across the measures on seriousness, discipline and willingness 
to report.  Similarly this study will create mean scores for the cases across these measures 
for the officers participating in the study (see table 4.5 to 4.9).   
Mean scores are a measure of central tendency and used to give the average 
distribution of scores for each case by department (Jackson, 2005).  By assigning mean 
scores rank order can be assigned for each case by department (Klockars, et al., 2004).  
Mode and Median scores are other measure of central tendency that will be used along 
with Mean score. 
Klockars, et al.., (2000) used an independent groups t-test to examine means 
scores across the cases for the measures on seriousness, discipline and willingness to 
report.  The small sample size of this research sample affects the ability of the researcher 
to use parametric statistical test.  This is a common problem in Criminal Justice research 
and the use of Chi-Square and cross tabs is acceptable (Dean & Gottschalk, 2011)  There 
were other issues such as the uneven distribution of the data that prevented the use of 
comparisons of means such as T- Test and ANOVA‘s.  As such non-parametric test such 
as Chi-Square were best for use in analyzing this data (Cronk, 2002; Weisburd & Britt, 
2007).  Chi-Square test of independence as a statistical test has very few assumptions 
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with its one important assumption being that ―no more than 20% of the categories should 
have expected frequencies of less than 5‖ (Cronk, 2002; 88). 
To meet the main assumption of the Chi-Square statistical test the data had to be 
transformed using the recoded feature in SPSS.  This recoding rationale was displayed in 
the data analysis portion of this dissertation (see tables 3.1 to 3.7).  Recoding allowed for 
the data to fit this assumption of the Chi-Square statistical test and was necessary for the 
data analysis to go forth.  Transforming data and recoding is useful part of data analysis 




Table 4.1: Frequency for presidency 








1988-1992 George Bush Sr. 
21 9.0% 18.6% 18.6% 
1993-2000 Clinton 
46 19.7% 40.7% 59.3% 
2001-2008 G.W. Bush 
23 9.9% 20.4% 79.6% 
2009-2011 Obama 
4 1.7% 3.5% 83.2% 
Other 
19 8.2% 16.8% 100.0% 
Total 
113 48.5% 100%   
System 
117 50.2%     
Total 
120 51.5%     
Total 
233 100.0%     
 
Table 4.1 shows that most of the officers came into their organization during the two 
terms of President Clinton.  Most of the study participants have been officers since before 
2001. The large number of missing cases is because the original data had no 
corresponding information for this variable.
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Table 4.2: Frequency for admin guidelines 









4 1.7% 3.4% 3.4% 
direct supervisor 
50 21.5% 43.1% 46.6% 
police chief 
21 9.0% 18.1% 64.7% 
police legal advisor 
2 .9% 1.7% 66.4% 
internal affairs 
4 1.7% 3.4% 69.8% 
never informed 
3 1.3% 2.6% 72.4% 
Other 
32 13.7% 27.6% 100.0% 
Total 
116 49.8% 100.0%   
Missing 
System 
117 50.2%     
Total 
233 100.0%     
 
Table 4.2 shows that most of the officers were informed by their direct supervisor of 
changes in administrative guidelines.  This shows the important role that supervisors have 
in maintaining an informed organization.  The large number of missing cases is because 
the original data had no corresponding information for this variable.
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Table 4.3: Frequency for police model 









6 2.6% 5.5% 5.5% 
problem solving policing 
55 23.6% 50.5% 56.0% 
community policing 
48 20.6% 44.0% 100.0% 
Total 
109 46.8% 100.0%   
Missing 
8 
7 3.0%     
System 
117 50.2%     
Total 
124 53.2%     
Total 
233 100.0%     
 
Table 4.3 shows that most of the officers preferred a Problem solving policing or 
Community policing model instead of the traditional policing model. The large number 
of missing cases is because the original data had no corresponding information for this 
variable.
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Table 4.4 Frequency for supervisor interaction 







Valid at beginning and end of 
shifts 
50 21.5% 45.5% 45.5% 
during the filing of reports 
13 5.6% 11.8% 57.3% 
at departmental meetings 
5 2.1% 4.5% 61.8% 
during casual/friendly 
meetings 
18 7.7% 16.4% 78.2% 
Other 
24 10.3% 21.8% 100.0% 
Total 
110 47.2% 100.0%   
Missing 
8 
6 2.6%     
System 
117 50.2%     
Total 
123 52.8%     
Total 
233 100.0%     
 
Table 4.4 shows that most officers interact with their supervisors on a daily basis at the 
beginning and end of their shifts. 
Table 4.5: Agency 1 Original Dataset Mean Scores 
Case Scenario 
Seriousness Discipline Willingness to Report 
Own View Other Officers Should Receive Would Receive Own View Other Officers 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Case 1. Off-Duty 
Security System 
Business 1.65 1 1.54 1 1.22 1 1.17 1 1.22 1 1.46 1 
Case 2. Free Meals, 
Discounts on Beat 2.76 4 2.19 3 2.19 2 2.32 2 1.46 2 1.65 2 
Case 3. Bribe From 
Speeding Motorist 4.95 10 4.59 10 4.65 10 4.65 9 3.46 9 3.32 10 
Case 4. Holiday Gifts 
From Merchants 2.31 2 2.09 2 2.28 3 2.47 3 1.58 3 1.69 
 
3 
Case 5. Crime Scene 
Theft of Watch 5 11 4.73 11 5.65 11 5.38 11 4.05 11 3.86 11 
Case 6. Auto Repair 
Shop 5% Kickback 4.11 7 3.7 7 3.84 8 3.89 8 3.05 8 2.81 7 
Case 7. Supervisor 
Holiday for Tuneup 4.22 8 4.05 8 3.51 7 3.27 6 2.89 7 3.03 9 
Case 8. Coverup of 
Police DUI Accident 2.61 3 2.41 4 2.57 4 3 4 1.78 4 1.69 4 
Case 9. Drinks to 
Ignore Late Bar 
Closing 3.94 6 3.25 6 3.22 6 3.37 7 2.22 5 1.83 5 
Case 10. Excessive 
Force on Car Thief 3.49 5 3 5 3 5 3.24 5 2.3 6 1.86 6 
Case 11. Theft From 




Table 4.6: Agency 1 Current Dataset Mean Scores 
Case Scenario 
Seriousness Discipline Willingness to Report 
Own View Other Officers Should Receive Would Receive Own View Other Officers 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Case 1. Off-Duty 
Security System 
Business 1.42 1 1.64 1 1.11 1 1.09 1 1.09 1 1.44 1 
Case 2. Free Meals, 
Discounts on Beat 3.02 3 2.31 2 2.38 3 2.24 2 1.69 2 1.67 2 
Case 3. Bribe From 
Speeding Motorist 4.98 10 4.84 10 5.05 9 4.75 10 3.86 9 3.5 10 
Case 4. Holiday Gifts 
From Merchants 2.82 2 2.36 3 2.22 2 2.24 3 1.78 3 1.89 
 
4 
Case 5. Crime Scene 
Theft of Watch 4.98 11 4.91 11 5.82 11 5.73 11 4.51 11 3.93 11 
Case 6. Auto Repair 
Shop 5% Kickback 4.47 7 4 7 4.51 8 4.36 8 3.82 8 3.47 9 
Case 7. Supervisor 
Holiday for Tuneup 4.49 8 4.31 8 4.24 7 3.96 7 3.62 7 3.42 7 
Case 8. Coverup of 
Police DUI Accident 3.11 4 2.87 4 2.51 4 2.47 4 1.78 4 1.73 3 
Case 9. Drinks to 
Ignore Late Bar 
Closing 4.38 6 3.78 6 3.69 6 3.73 6 2.89 6 2.71 6 
Case 10. Excessive 
Force on Car Thief 3.44 5 3.04 5 3 5 2.96 5 2.33 5 2.07 5 
Case 11. Theft From 




Table 4.7: Agency 2 Original Dataset Mean Scores  
Case Scenario 
Seriousness Discipline Willingness to Report 
Own View Other Officers Should Receive Would Receive Own View Other Officers 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Case 1. Off-Duty 
Security System 
Business 1.53 1 1.5 1 1.28 1 1.54 1 1.34 1 1.39 1 
Case 2. Free Meals, 
Discounts on Beat 2.5 2 2.13 2 2.03 2 2.34 2 1.55 2 1.64 2 
Case 3. Bribe From 
Speeding Motorist 4.89 11 4.68 11 4.59 10 4.68 10 3 9 2.96 10 
Case 4. Holiday Gifts 
From Merchants 2.53 3 2.39 3 2.49 3 3.01 4 1.85 3 2.05 4 
Case 5. Crime Scene 




Case 6. Auto Repair 
Shop 5% Kickback 4.08 7 3.73 8 3.84 8 4.04 8 2.75 8 2.75 8 
Case 7. Supervisor 
Holiday for Tuneup 3.81 6 3.45 6 3.2 6 3.24 5 2.55 6 2.6 7 
Case 8. Coverup of 
Police DUI Accident 2.6 4 2.53 4 2.51 4 2.91 3 1.95 4 1.99 3 
Case 9. Drinks to 
Ignore Late Bar 
Closing 4.15 8 3.69 7 3.65 7 3.87 7 2.64 7 2.54 6 
Case 10. Excessive 
Force on Car Thief 3.35 5 2.96 5 2.95 5 3.32 6 2.28 5 2.1 5 
Case 11. Theft From 




Table 4.8: Agency 2 Current Dataset Means Scores 
Case Scenario 
Seriousness Discipline Willingness to Report 
Own View Other Officers Should Receive Would Receive Own View Other Officers 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Case 1. Off-Duty 
Security System 
Business 1.24 1 1.31 1 1.16 1 1.16 1 1.11 1 1.33 1 
Case 2. Free Meals, 
Discounts on Beat 2.87 3 2.31 3 2.11 2 2.2 2 1.84 2 1.75 2 
Case 3. Bribe From 
Speeding Motorist 4.98 10 4.91 11 5.07 10 4.89 10 3.82 11 3.29 10 
Case 4. Holiday Gifts 
From Merchants 2.41 2 2.18 2 2.24 3 2.39 3 1.93 3 1.84 
 
3  
Case 5. Crime Scene 
Theft of Watch 5 11 4.69 10 5.33 11 5.34 11 3.71 10 3.57 11 
Case 6. Auto Repair 
Shop 5% Kickback 4.6 8 4.31 8 4.42 8 4.44 8 3.4 8 3.29 9 
Case 7. Supervisor 
Holiday for Tuneup 4.22 6 3.91 6 3.48 6 3.39 5 3.09 6 2.89 6 
Case 8. Coverup of 
Police DUI Accident 3.48 4 3.02 4 3.14 4 3.28 4 2.41 4 2.18 4 
Case 9. Drinks to 
Ignore Late Bar 
Closing 4.39 7 4.14 7 3.8 7 3.7 7 3.34 7 3.05 7 
Case 10. Excessive 
Force on Car Thief 3.93 5 3.27 5 3.45 5 3.5 6 3.09 5 2.59 5 
Case 11. Theft From 





Table 4.9: Agency 3 Current Dataset Means Scores 
Case Scenario 
Seriousness Discipline Willingness to Report 
Own View Other Officers Should Receive Would Receive Own View Other Officers 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Case 1. Off-Duty 
Security System 
Business 1.85 1 1.58 1 1.19 1 1.19 1 1.44 1 1.32 1 
Case 2. Free Meals, 
Discounts on Beat 3.38 2 2.58 2 2.54 2 2.38 2 3.19 2 2.27 2 
Case 3. Bribe From 
Speeding Motorist 5 10 5 10 5.35 8 5.38 10 4.85 8 4.58 10 
Case 4. Holiday 
Gifts From 
Merchants 3.81 3 3.31 4 3.27 4 3.12 3 3.85 4 2.85 4 
Case 5. Crime 
Scene Theft of 
Watch 5 11 5 11 5.92 1 5.92 11 4.96 11 4.73 
 
 
       11 
Case 6. Auto 
Repair Shop 5% 
Kickback 4.96 8 4.81 9 5.5 10 5.35 9 4.96 10 4.42 9 
Case 7. Supervisor 
Holiday for Tuneup 4.85 7 4.69 6 4.31 7 4.19 7 4.81 7 4.27 8 
Case 8. Coverup of 
Police DUI 
Accident 3.81 4 3.12 3 3.19 3 3.19 4 3.31 3 2.38 3 
Case 9. Drinks to 
Ignore Late Bar 
Closing 4.84 6 4.72 7 4.12 6 4.04 6 4.72 6 3.8 6 
Case 10. Excessive 
Force on Car Thief 4.38 5 3.71 5 3.88 5 3.71 5 4.29 5 3 5 
Case 11. Theft 








Results and Data Analysis 
 
Comparing the mean scores for the original and current dataset across agencies 
one and two (see tables 4.5 to 4.8) provides insight about the changing environments 
within these agencies.  Using the .50 ―rule of thumb‖ to determine the substantially 
important variables in the dataset a number of cases were found to have changed across 
multiple measures (Klockars et al., 2005).  For both agencies the mean scores were 
higher across nearly all cases and all measures.  Specifically for agency one cases six 
(auto repair), seven (supervisor) and nine (bar) were found to have changed by more than 
.50 ―rule of thumb‖.  For agency two cases six (auto repair), eight (DUI) and ten (force) 
were found to have changed by more than .50 ―rule of thumb‖.  These findings are further 
supported by the other analyses within this dissertation. 
Appendix F will include data tables for only those variables found to be 
significant in the analysis.  These data tables contain information provided by the SPSS 
analysis of the data.  The dependent and independent variables included in these analyses 
were named earlier in the paper (see Table 1.1., 2.1 to 2.11). 
As stated earlier in the paper the failure to meet the assumptions of parametric 
statistical test meant using Chi-Square test of independence to examine differences across 
groups.  The chi-square test is used often by criminal justice researchers because of the 
failure of most data to meet the assumptions of parametric test of significance and the  
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small sample sizes of most criminal justice data (Weisburg & Britt, 2007).  In this 
analysis the departments were combined and recoded into two groups.  These groups 
were renamed original police departments and current police departments.  To 
maintaining the reliability of comparison the third agency from which data was collected 
but lacked a comparison group from the original data was removed from this analysis. 
This meant that only two agencies and their corresponding data were included in this 
analysis (see Tables 5.1 to 5.33 in Appendix F).  
Chi-Squares were run for all 11 case scenarios using the seven questions which 
examined seriousness, discipline and willingness to report for each case. Below please 
find the results for this analysis.  Please make note that only significant findings will be 
reported.  Any unreported findings were found to be insignificant by the analyses and 
reported in the following (see tables 5.33, 6.2, 7.12, 8.8, 9.6, 10.1, 11.5, 12.8, 13.6 and 





Discussions and Conclusions 
 
The world has changed immeasurably in the 15 years since the seminal Klockars et al., 
(2000) study was conducted.  This change has especially permeated in the world of policing.  
Police officers now add a new duty to their list of responsibilities.  They are in the front lines 
of the War on Terror protecting citizens from those that aim to do this country harm 
domestically.  This change along with other changes in areas such as training, policing model 
and administrative guidelines have all occurred in the aftermath of the original study. 
The Klockars et al., (2000) study has been replicated a number of times during this 
time span (Alain, 2004; Ekenvall, 2003; Huberts et al., 2003; Ivkovich, 2005; Newham, 2002.  
These replications have contributed to the literature and provided insight into the issue of 
police integrity yet they have all failed to re-examine the population studied in the original 
study.  These replications have nearly solely concentrated on examining police departments 
internationally using the research tool (Klockars, et al., 2004).  Those agencies that 
participated in the original study have not been revisited.  This is important because cycles of 
corruption normally take place at major police departments across the country in time spans of 
10 to 20 years.  This provides further incentive to examine the groups from the original 
research group. 
This study was designed to investigate how the cumulative collections of factors over 
the past 15 years would affect the environment of policing at a number of agencies that were 
part of the original study.   Changes in mean scores for the cases from the old agency and new 
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agency data could give insight into changes in the police culture.  The addition of variables 
such as training type, administrative guidelines, family history, and early warning systems will 
provide insight into the impact that these tools could have in the pursuit of integrity as it 
relates to the cases.  The literature has pointed to these being factors that influence the policing 
culture or tools that have been created to prevent the growth of corruption within departments 
(Klockars, 2006; Walker, 2007; White and Escobar, 2008). 
A major part of this study, were the differences across the police departments.  This 
held true for the comparison between the original (N = 117) and current departments (N=90).  
It also was noted across the current departments solely (N = 116).  But these were not the only 
significant finding across the variables.  Variables such as police model, training, length of 
service and officer position were also found to be significant across a number of the cases.  
Finally, variables such as early warning system, post academy training, having had family 
members in the police department and administrative guidelines offered little or no support in 
terms of their influence as it pertained to the cases. 
The results of this study will be examined by reviewing each specific hypotheses in 
depth below: 
Hypotheses one to five aimed to test whether environments of policing had changed at 
the departments from the original study (N=117) to the current dataset (N =90).  Two agencies 
from the original study were retested using the original research tool.  The third agency from 
which data was collected was not used in this analysis as it did not have a corresponding data 
group for comparison.  The hypothesis predicts that the environment of policing has changed 
in the aftermath of the original study.  The changes implemented in its aftermath plus the 
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passage of time, have made police officer viewpoints of seriousness, discipline and 
willingness to report more likely. 
These findings are reflected in tables (5.1 to 5.33) and present a vast amount of 
support for these hypotheses.  As it relates to own view of significance, four of the cases were 
found to be significant.  These cases were Auto, Supervisor, Alcohol and Force (see tables 
5.11, 5.17, 5.23, and 5.28).  These analyses all indicated that those at current police 
departments were more likely to rate their own seriousness of offense at a higher level than 
those in the original police departments as it related to these cases.  
The Auto, Supervisor, Alcohol and Wallet cases were all found to be significant for 
others view of seriousness (see tables 5.12, 5.18, 5.24 and 5.29).  The analysis for these cases 
resulted in findings that were similar to those of the own seriousness variable.  Those at 
current police departments were more likely to rate their others seriousness of offense at a 
higher level than those in the original police departments.  An interesting note as it relates to 
both seriousness variables was the support across both the own and other view of seriousness.  
As it relates to these cases officers at the current departments were likely to believe that views 
of seriousness had increased not only for themselves but for other officers within their 
departments. 
The second and third hypotheses sought to test whether there had been any changes in 
the environment of policing as it relates to the discipline variables from the original to the new 
study.  Once again this hypothesis predicts that changes implemented in the aftermath of the 
original study have resulted in increases in view of the discipline should and would receive for 
the cases. 
 97 
Five variables were found to be significant for the discipline should receive variable.  
Speed, Burglary, Auto, Supervisor and Wallet were the significant cases (see tables 5.2, 5.7, 
5.13, 5.19, and 5.30).  These cases all support the hypothesis as those officers at current 
departments were more likely to rate discipline should receive at a higher level than those in 
the original police departments. 
Five variables were also found to be significant for discipline would receive across the 
cases.  These were Business, Holiday, Burglary, Auto and Supervisor (see table 5.1, 5.6, 5.8, 
5.14 and 5.20.  These cases were divided on the support they offered to the hypothesis.  The 
Burglary, Auto and Supervisor variables indicated that those officers in current police 
departments were more likely to feel that the behavior would receive a more serious discipline 
than those in the original police departments.  However, in the Burglary and Holiday cases 
those in the original police departments were more likely to recommend a more serious 
discipline for the cases than those in the current police departments.   
The Burglary, Auto, and Supervisor cases were all found to be significant across both 
the discipline should and would receive variables.  This points towards not only a significant 
increase in the measures from the original data to the current data, but also indicates support 
for the departments discipline guidelines by officers.  Officers in the current departments 
believed that the increased discipline by the departments for these behaviors was warranted as 
they also felt there should be an increased discipline for engaging in the activities.  This 
supports the hypothesis that officers will agree with department guidelines for discipline. 
Hypothesis five and six dealt with the reporting of the behaviors described in the case 
scenarios.  As with the first three hypotheses, these hypotheses posit that officers will be more 
willing to report and feel that others will report behaviors related to the cases.  It predicts that 
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environments of policing have changed since the original study took place at both of the 
departments. 
Six of the cases were found to be significant for the variable would you report this 
behavior.  Speed, Burglary, Auto, Supervisor, Bar and Wallet cases were found to be 
significant for own willingness to report (see tables 5.3, 5.9, 5.15, 5.21, 5.26, and 5.31).  These 
cases all provided the same support to indicating that those at current police departments were 
more likely to report the behavior at a higher level than those in the original police 
departments. 
Six of these cases were also found to be significant for the others willingness to report 
variable.  These cases were Speed, Burglary, Auto, Supervisor, Bar and Wallet.  Each of these 
cases supported the hypothesis as those at the current police departments were more likely to 
feel others at their department would report the behavior at a higher level than those in the 
original police departments (see table 5.4, 5.10, 5.16, 5.22, 5.27 and 5.32).   
It should be noted that across both the own willingness to report and others willingness 
to report variables all the cases were the same.  At least as it pertains to these cases at these 
departments there appears to have been a change in the ―code of silence‖ that these variables 
attempt to test.  This change was especially drastic because all the cases were significant for 
not only ones willingness to report but others willingness to report.  This points to a change in 
the environment of policing as it relates to the long cited blue wall of silence.   
During the informal interview segment of this project an officer gave a hint that this 
might be a possibility in the current policing environment.  The officer stated ―the blue wall 
of silence is very thin and can crash at anytime‖.  He referenced this statement when 
explaining how one would go about choosing when they would participate in the cases 
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used in the study.  This is interesting because not too long ago the ―blue wall of silence‖ 
was viewed as invincible but it appears a change has occurred in the environment of 
policing over the past 15 years to change this viewpoint as far as it involves these two 
departments. 
Despite the fact that significant interactions were only found for the cases noted 
above as it related to the seriousness, discipline and willingness to report variables, it 
appeared that across the board there was an increase in mean scores in nearly all cases 
(see table 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8).  The two groups of police officers that have received the 
bulk of the attention from corruption researchers are the ―meat eaters‖ and ―grass eaters‖ 
(Barker and Roebuck, 1973).  However, there is a third group of police officers that had 
received little to no attention in corruption research.  These groups of officers do not 
participate in corrupt behavior and have been identified as ―the birds‖ (Barker and 
Roebuck, 1973).  These officers are identified as birds because they do not ―eat anything‖ 
instead they ―just fly up high‖ because they are the officers that maintain the integrity of 
the department (Barker and Roebuck, 1973; 35).  These individuals were later identified 
as straight shooters in Barker (2006) five part officer typology.  The examination of this 
group within this project fills a gap in the policing literature. 
These changes in mean scores could be most directly the result of an increased 
role by ―the birds‖ in developing a department of integrity as it pertained to these two 
departments.  Officers are less willing to turn a blind eye to questionable behavior.  The 
―birds‖ are participating in a vital role within their department, they are increasing the 
environment of integrity.  The cause of this increased view in seriousness, discipline and 
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willingness to report can be further explained by looking at a number of factors that have 
been noted as being possibly being influential of environments of integrity. 
Hypothesis six tested whether departmental guidelines or more specifically being 
informed of departmental guidelines on consistent basis would make a difference across the 
case scenarios.  This variable relied upon the literature that states that an individual could be 
participating in corruption related activities because they lack knowledge that an activity is 
against departmental policy (Kaariainen, et., 2008; Klockars, et al., 2004; Klockars, et al., 
2006).  To examine this variable both frequencies and crosstabs were run. 
The variable informadminchanges was run to examine who informs officers of 
changes in guidelines.  The most common group that informed officers of administrative 
guidelines were direct supervision (N=50) with 21.5%, followed by other (N=32) 13.7%, 
police chiefs (N=21) 9%, Self-informed (N=4) 1.7% and internal affairs (N=4) 1.7%, never 
informed (N=3) 1.3% and police legal advisor (N=2) .9%) (see table 4.2).  The findings 
support the importance of the direct supervisor in maintaining integrity within departments 
(Engel, 2001).  This was a factor highlighted during the informal interviews when officers 
mentioned that they were normally informed of changes by their direct supervisor. 
A crosstab was run for time period informed of administrative changes and the case 
scenarios.  This crosstab found one significant association with time period informed of 
administrative changes and case scenarios (see table 6.1 and 6.2).  This points to knowledge of 
administrative guidelines having little to do with integrity related issues.  This ties into a 
comment made during the informal interviews where officers stated ―they did not know 
something was bad until someone did it‖.  It appears that violations as it relates to 
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administrative guidelines were tied more directly to officers moral views and not necessarily 
to being the most informed department in the country. 
Prior to getting into the next analysis we should examine the length of service for the 
sample.  This variable was used to provide insight on only the new police departments and 
lack corresponding variables from the original dataset.  To maintain anonymity of the study 
we provided a timeline based upon presidencies by which officers chose when they entered 
the service.  There seemed to be a relatively even distribution of when these officers entered 
service with the majority (N = 46) of 19.7% entering during the two terms of Bill Clinton, 
Another 9.9% (N=23) entered service during the presidency of G.W. Bush, 9% (N=21) 
entered service during the presidency of president George Bush, 8.2 % (N=19) indicated other 
presidents not named and finally 1.7% (N=4) stated they entered service during the Obama 
administration. 
The date of service variable was recoded to become a pre-2001 and post-2001 variable 
to examine whether younger officers differ from those officers with over ten years on the 
force.  Although this was not part of the original research plan it was created in the aftermath 
of the informal interviews as officers noted that more time in service made them less likely to 
sanction the activities noted in the cases.  Hypothesis seven predicts that length of service 
would result in higher mean scores for the case across the integrity measures. 
Eleven significant interactions were found as it related to the variable date of service 
and the cases (see table 7.12).  Those officers that joined the department pre-2001 were found 
to be more likely to report the cases at a significantly higher rate than those that joined the 
department post-2001.  The five case scenarios that were found significant as it related to the 
own reporting variable were Speed, Holiday, Burglary, Auto, Force and Wallet.  This supports 
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what was alluded to during the informal interviews during which officers stated that they were 
less accepting of the behavior cited in the cases as their time in service has increased.  The 
factors influencing this dynamic are unclear but could be tied to hypotheses eight to ten which 
look at differences in the cases as it relates to supervisor and line officers. 
Hypotheses eight to ten tested whether position in police department affected your 
view on the case scenarios as it related to seriousness, discipline and willingness to report.  
Since this variable did not have corresponding information from the original database this 
variable only examines the influence across the new datasets.  The findings for this variable 
are reflected in tables (8.1 to 8.8).  The tables provide some support for the viewpoint that 
supervisors will rate cases higher than line officers. 
In general the supervisors are much tougher in their assessments of incidents than 
line officers.  This was especially true as it came to the force and speed case scenarios.  
This can be due to factors such as length of time (as noted in hypothesis seven), increased 
duties and responsibilities affecting viewpoints of behaviors and the possibility that they 
were better informed of administrative guidelines.  Huberts et al., (2007) supported this 
finding in their study when they indicated the importance of role modeling by supervision 
in reducing unethical behaviors within agencies.  According to this study supervisors 
must have a stricter view of integrity so that officers can model their behavior and result 
in more integrity throughout the agency.  
Hypothesis eleven dealt with the impact of type of academy training and the integrity 
measures across the current police departments.  It was hypothesized based upon the literature 
that a Pedagogy style of training would lead more officers to participate in activities associated 
with the ―code of silence‖.  These findings of this analysis are reflected in tables (9.1 to 9.6) 
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and provide little support for the hypothesis.  Although a small number of interactions were 
found to be significant none were found to be associated with the reporting variables that 
would indicate an association with the code of silence.  This hypothesis appears to have been 
disproven as its effect was negligible as it relates to this study.   This stands in contrast to the 
literature (Caldero & Crank, 2004; White & Escobar, 2008) which as pointed to training styles 
being influential of environments of policing. 
Hypothesis twelve dealt with the association of post academy training and integrity 
across the current police departments.  It specifically sought to test how the environment of 
integrity was affected by continued training.  These findings are reflected in table (10.1).  
There is no support for this variable as no interactions were found to be significant.  This is 
interesting because the literature had identified this as possibly being an issue of integrity 
within departments (Klockars, et al., 2006). 
Hypothesis thirteen dealt with the association of police accountability measure and 
integrity across the current departments.  It specifically sought to test how early warning 
systems could influence environments of integrity within departments.  The findings are 
reflected in table (11.1 to 11.5).  Although significant variables were identified by the analysis 
there does not seem to be a pattern identified within these variables because of the small 
number of significant interaction identified.  This combined with statements from the informal 
interviews indicates that perhaps early warning systems do not even serve a deterrent effect as 
it relates to integrity issues. 
 Hypothesis fourteen dealt with the association of police model and integrity across the 
current departments.  It specifically sought to test how differences in a problem solving, 
community policing and traditional model might affect incidents of integrity as it relates to the 
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cases.  Although a small number of variables were found significant for this variable they do 
offer directionality by pointing towards the traditional policing model being tied to less serous 
views on these integrity related issues (see tables 12.1 to 12.8).  This variable requires future 
evaluation because of the restrictions associated with this analysis. 
Hypothesis fifteen examined the association between having a family member in the 
police force and integrity across the new departments.  This variable was analyzed in the 
aftermath of the informal interviews, when some officers pointed to their family members 
influencing their viewpoints of the police integrity.  Specifically, officers pointed towards 
family introducing them into the concept of a ―code of silence‖ so that they knew when to 
keep their mouth quiet once they joined the force.  Although a couple of cases were found 
significant for this variable there was little support for the influence of family as it relates to 
views on the cases. 
The findings of significance support the view that some of these variables have been 
influential in the change in police culture over the years since the original study.  The most 
viable variables appear to be length of service, position within the departments and police 
model.   Despite these being the only significant variables found in the analysis all the 
variables deserve continued study to thoroughly understand the dynamics of factors that 
influence integrity.   
Hypothesis sixteen dealt with the environment of integrity across the current police 
departments.  It specifically sought to test how the environment of integrity at the new police 
departments differed across each other.  These findings are reflected in Tables (14.1 to 14.38).  
These tables indicate a number of things about how these departments differed across case 
scenarios. 
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The Business, Holiday, Supervisor and Force cases (see tables 14.1, 14.7, 14.16 and 
14.28)  were found to be significant for own view of seriousness.  Holiday, Supervisor, Bar 
and Force cases (see tables 14.8, 14.17, 14.25 and 14.29) were all found to be significant for 
others view of seriousness.  Across the Holiday, Supervisor and Force cases there was support 
across both the own and other view of seriousness.  As it related to the seriousness variables 
Agency three was the top rated agency as it pertained all seriousness variable while Agency 
two was normally the least rated agency as it pertained to most of the significant seriousness 
variables.  
The Meal, Holiday, Supervisor, Alcohol, Force and Wallet cases were found to be 
significant for Discipline should receive (see tables14.2, 14.10, 14.18, 14.22, 14.30 and 14.34).   
Supervisor, Alcohol, Force and Wallet cases were all found to be significant for Discipline 
would receive (see tables 14.19, 14.23, 14.31 and 14.35).  Across the Supervisor, Alcohol, 
Force and Wallet cases there was support across both the discipline should and would receive 
variables.  As it related to the discipline variables Agency three was the top rated agency as it 
pertained all discipline variables, while Agency one and two were equally likely to be the least 
rated agency as it pertained to most of the significant discipline variables.   
The Meal, Speed, Holiday, Auto, Supervisor, Alcohol, Bar, Force and Wallet cases 
were found to be significant (see tables 14.3, 14.5, 14.11, 14.14, 14.20, 14.24, 14.26, 14.32 
and 14.36) for own willingness to report.  Meal, Speed, Holiday, Burglary, Auto, Supervisor, 
Bar, Force and Wallet cases were all found to be significant (see tables 14.4, 14.6, 14.12, 
14.14, 14.15, 14.21, 14.27, 14.33 and 14.37) for others willingness to report.  Across the Meal, 
Speed, Holiday, Auto, Supervisor, Bar and Force cases there was support across both the 
reporting variables.  As it related to the reporting variables Agency three was the top rated 
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agency as it pertained all reporting variables, while Agency one and two were equally likely to 
be the least rated agency as it pertained to most of the significant reporting variables.   
This could be the result of different policing environments making the case scenarios 
more and less acceptable within the departments.  Please refer to tables 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9 to 
view the differences and similarities across departments in mean scores and rankings.  This 
also provides evidence that policing environment are unique despite being in similar locations. 
These analyses provide insight into the state of integrity at these departments that 
participated of the original study.  The findings indicate as it pertains to the Klockars, et al., 
(2000) research tool officers at the departments will rate cases more serious, recommend 
harsher discipline and be more willing to report the behavior.  This points to an increase in 
integrity among officers and indirectly indicates that there has been a reduction in corruption 
among these departments. 
This analysis expanded upon the original Klockars, et al., (2000) study by examining 
the impact of a number of independent variables (see table 1.1) on the mean scores across the 
cases.  The analysis found that a number of factors (e.g. training, administrative guidelines and 
early warning system) that had previously been mentioned with an environment of integrity 
had very little impact as far as it related to scores across the measures for these agencies.  
However some factors were found to have a significant relationship (e.g. length of service, 
position in department, and police model) across the integrity measures as it relates to these 
departments.  These factors should be examined in future analyses to examine whether these 
findings of significance can be replicated across other departments. 
A factor that this study could not examine was the influence of the September 11, 
2001 attacks had on policing.  Since the departments examined were in the northeastern 
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United States they were especially susceptible to being influenced by these attacks.  The 
literature points to changes in policing styles since 9/11 influencing police environments 
(Murray, 2005; Pelfrey, Jr., 2005; Ratcliffe, & Guidetti, 2008).  A new policing model called 
intelligence-led policing which is ―proactive‖, ―managerial centered‖, and contains an 
important intelligence gathering mechanism that relies upon the general public (Ratcliffe & 
Guidetti, 2008; 112; Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer; 2005). 
The reliance upon the general public, places increased incentive upon officers to 
maintain an environment of integrity within departments.  Integrity related issues and 
involvement in organizational deviance could ―threaten the legitimacy‖ of the organization 
(Poveda, 1985; 255).  Losing this trust could result in a loss of confidence in police by the 
general public and even create dissent among officers.  This would affect their ability to 
properly execute the intelligence gathering portion of their duties.  Failure to properly gather 
intelligence could result in the inability for officers to carry out their important expanded 
duties of protecting this country at the local level. 
Another factor that could be influencing the mean scores across these departments 
could be the ―fear of scandal‖.  Poveda (1985) found that ―the anticipation of scandal may 
have the effect of reducing organization deviance‖ (p.256).  Since corruption scandals have 
occurred cyclical, occurring every 15 to 20 years at most departments for the last 100 years.  It 
is possible that these agencies are being extra vigilant as to not become the next notorious 
department noted for integrity related issues.  It is ironic that fear of corruption could be at the 
root of an increase in integrity as found within these departments.  It is possible that any of 
these factors could be responsible for the changes that we found across the integrity measures.  
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Limitation of Study 
Validity issues have long been a concern as it pertained to measurement in corruption 
research.  Similarly this concern has been raised in the growing field of integrity research.  
Some have argued that police officers are trained to answer questions related to integrity 
and corruption.  This possibility was raised in a study examining integrity in the Japanese 
police force.  Specifically, it was found that Japanese officers may be taught how to 
answer questions that inquire about corruption within the department (Johnson, 2004).  
Schafer & Martinelli (2008) found that participants in surveys of integrity normally view 
themselves as having more integrity than their peers.  This creates a validity issue for the 
research tool as the answers may not be indicative of how officer truly view the cases.  
We attempted to address the concerns by conducting the informal interviews at the 
departments that participated.  Allowing the officers to give feedback on the research 
instrument meant that revisions could be implemented that improved the response rate for 
the study.  Despite these concerns the research tool has proven valid in its ability to 
examine issues of integrity and corruption (Ekenvall, 2003; Klockars, et al., 2000; 
Klockars, et al., 2004; Klockars, et al., 2006; Newham, 2002; Schafer & Martinelli, 
2008). 
This project was severely limited as a replication because it lacked the funding 
that the original study had from the National Institute of Justice.  Additionally, the 
contacts that the researchers had at the original agencies were mostly no longer there 
because of attrition such as retirement or moving on to other organizations.  As such we 
were limited in whom to contact at agencies for participation in the study.  Finally, the 
environment of policing has always been extremely secretive and many departments are 
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against displaying their culture to researchers.  Many fear that data from a study 
examining integrity may project negatively across the department despite anonymity 
being guaranteed for researchers.  This is what occurred to the researchers as they 
pursued a third agency to participate in the study.   
 We were also limited because of the small sample size and small number of agencies 
that participated in the study.  This restricted the types of analysis that could be conducted by 
the researchers.  It also affected our ability to generalize the findings of the research study 
beyond the departments that were examined.  Policing within the United States presents an 
issue for researcher because of its decentralized model.  Since this study collected data 
from mostly Northeastern police departments it may only be generalized to police 
departments within this region of the country.  Despite these hurdles this project does 
shed light on the culture of policing today and displays some of the changes that have 






The effects of corruption can be felt throughout a society.  It effects the police 
department, community and even the government in some cases.  Corruption can create 
an atmosphere of distrust within police departments.  Police may feel they cannot confide 
in their supervisors‘ or partners and this could prevent them from performing their duties 
efficiently.  It could create resentment from the community.  The spread of misconduct 
stories can have a widespread effect on communities as negative views permeate (Hurst, 
McDermott and Thomas, 2005).  This resentment can lead to distrust in the police force, 
increases in violent crimes and become a detriment to future police investigations (Kane, 
2005).  Finally, it can affect the government if the corruption is committed on a large 
enough scale to undermine the social order. 
Issues of corruption have not gone unnoticed by the public especially in recent 
years.  A study examining public confidence in a number of notable professions found 
that police officers received the largest drop of any group as it pertained to public 
confidence.  Specifically in 1980 they were ranked fifth, by 1995 they had dropped to 
tenth in the scale of public confidence (Gaffigan & McDonald, 1997).  This study into 
public confidence supports the belief that the public trust in police has been marred 
because of notable scandals that occurred prior to the original Klockars, et al. (2000) into 
police integrity.  These integrity issues can complicate the ability of the police to properly 
execute their important positions in society (Gaffigan & McDonald, 1997).  The current 
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study aimed to further understand the dynamics of integrity issues within the United 
States. 
Issues related to corruption and integrity had not been studied thoroughly within the 
United States in the time period since the original study took place.  This left a gap in the 
literature that this dissertation attempting to project some information upon.  However because 
of the lack of resources this project was only able to begin shedding light unto how the culture 
of integrity has changed over the last 15 years.  This issue will only to continue to grow in 
importance as police take a more pivotal role in national security concerns. 
Future studies should attempt to include more agencies and officers in the analyses.  
More complex analyses that attempt to examine the interactions between the variables instead 
of relying solely upon one on one interactions could provide a better perspective on the those 
factors that influence corruption.  A number of variables noted in the literature such as 
training, knowledge of guidelines, police model and early warning systems received little 
support in this study but should continue to be researched to examine any possible impact that 
they may have influencing integrity.  Finally, future studies should examine the influence of 
intelligence-led policing and other changes implemented in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  
Since so many changes have been implanted in the intervening years it would be interesting to 
see how they affect integrity related issues among police.  Although alluded to possibly 
influencing policing in the literature this topic has not been studied in any sort of complex 
analysis as it relates to integrity related issues.  The continued study of these variables and 
others could provide a clearer perspective on the factors that caused the changes noted that 






JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
   The City University of New York 
              445 West 59
th
 Street 
   New York, NY 10019 -1128 
   (212) 237-8653 
     
Informed Consent Form 
                                     
You are invited to participate in a research study entitled ―Call of Duty: A 
question of Police Integrity.‖ The purpose of this research is to better understand the 
factors that influence Police Integrity and violations of Police Integrity. We plan to enroll 
approximately 150-200 participants into this study.  If you decide to participate, you will 
be asked to complete a survey on Police Integrity.  Participation should take about 25-30 
minutes for duration of one day.  
The foreseeable risks of participation in this study are minimal.  In order to 
minimize these risks all answers will be kept confidential and there will be no link 
between participant identifiers and responses.  The possible benefits to you could include 
raising your self-awareness of violations of Police Integrity and helping to better report 
future violations of Police Integrity.  The potential benefits to society will be both 
scholastic and practical. The study will fill gaps in the literature and assist policymakers 
by providing valuable information that will aid in improving Police Integrity. 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary.  You have a right to 
refuse to participate without consequences.  If you decide not to participate your decision 
will not affect your relationship with John Jay College or the researcher.  If you decide to 
participate you may discontinue participation at any time. You may refuse to answer any 
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specific questions or refuse to engage in any task at any time during the study.  
Withdrawal or refusing to answer specific questions or engage in specific tasks will not 
result in any consequences to you and will not affect your relationship with John Jay 
College or the researcher.   
Information gathered from you will only be used in conjunction with this research 
project. Information concerning the identity of the participants will not be disclosed for 
any reason. Consent forms will be kept in separately locked cabinets from the 
questionnaires and participant responses will be totally anonymous. Both sets of 
information will be in locked drawers in the office of Albert Gamarra which is locked at 
all times, with access available to only Albert Gamarra.  
 Your signature below means that you have read this consent form, that you fully 
understand the nature and consequences of participation and that you have had all 
questions regarding participation in this study answered satisfactorily.   If you have 
further questions about this research please feel free to contact the Principle Investigator, 
Albert Gamarra at 917 375 4841 or Dr. Maki Haberfeld at 212 237 8381. 
If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research participant please 
feel free to contact the John Jay Institutional Review Board Office at  
jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu, or (212) 237-8961 and speak with Thomas Kucharski. There is no 
psychological or physical harm expected for participating in this study.  Should you wish 
to speak to a counselor about your experiences, counseling services at John Jay College is 








Counseling Services (212) 237 – 8111   
John Jay College of Criminal Justice    
899 Tenth Avenue, Room 3140 N 
New York, NY 10019 
 
_________________________   _________________________ 
Participant Name      Participant Signature 
________________________   _________________________ 





Case scenarios: The survey questionnaire presents officers with 11 hypothetical case 
scenarios. Respondents were asked to evaluate each scenario by answering seven 
questions (see Appendix C). 
 
Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs 
security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty 
hours. 
 
Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small 
value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to 
abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. 
 
Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a 
personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. 
 
Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local 
merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by 
giving him gifts of food and liquor. 
 
Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are 
smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he 
takes a watch, worth about 2 days‘ pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had 
been stolen during the burglary. 
 
Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer 
the owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he 
receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner. 
 
Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to 
work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees 
to tune up his supervisor‘s personal car. Evaluate the supervisor’s behavior. 
 
Case 8. At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a 
deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. 
He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously 
intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this 
accident and offense, he transports the driver to his home. 
 
Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past 
its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to 
accept a couple of free drinks from the owner. 
Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break 
into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before 
apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under 
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control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for 
fleeing and resisting. 
 
Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money 
equivalent to a full day‘s pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property 





Case scenario assessment options: Six of these questions were designed to assess the 
normative inclination of police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of 
their occupation. The remaining question asked respondents whether the behavior 
described in the scenario was a violation of the agency‘s official policy. 
 
1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be? 
 
Not at all serious         Very serious 
1    2    3    4   5 
 
2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this 
behavior to be? 
 
Not at all serious         Very serious 
1    2    3    4   5 
 
 
3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency? 
 
Definitely not          Definitely yes 
1    2    3    4   5 
 
 
4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, 
what if any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow? 
1. NONE     4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY 
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND   5. DEMOTION IN RANK 
3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND   6. DISMISSAL 
 
 
5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, 
what if any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow? 
1. NONE     4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY 
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND   5. DEMOTION IN RANK 
3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND   6. DISMISSAL 
 
 
6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior? 
 
Definitely not          Definitely yes 





7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow 
police officer who engaged in this behavior? 
 
Definitely not          Definitely yes 












 Initial inquiries have been made with police agencies to identify agencies willing 
to participate in the project. While conducting these inquiries the researcher submitted 
and received approval on July 19, 2009 for the project from the City University of New 
York- institutional review board (IRB). Once approval was obtained the researcher 
completed the literature review on the topic in preparation for the dissertation proposal.  
After completing the dissertation proposal stage the researcher will begin the process of 
collecting data from participants. Through the researchers personal contact participants 
will be obtained. 
Approval of departmental supervisors will be obtained and they will assist in the 
process of distributing the surveys and collecting data. This approval will allow for the 
project to take place at departments with the consent of the supervisors ensuring that the 
surveys will not be confiscated. The surveys will be mailed to department contacts and 
distributed to participating officers. The participants will each be given 2 envelopes with 
the appropriate instructions about participation in the study and the surveys. Participants 
will receive a consent form about the experiment (see Appendix A). There will be no 
deception involved. The consent form will include the contact information for the 
principle investigator. They will be asked to read these forms and those individuals that 
do not wish to continue participation in the study will be allowed to not participate 
without penalty. Those individuals who wish to continue participation in the study will be 
asked to sign the forms and place it in one envelope. They will then complete the survey 
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and place it in the second envelope which they will then seal. Both envelopes will be sent 
back to the researchers by their contact in the respective police departments. Survey will 
not have any identifying information and will be placed in different envelopes than the 
consent forms. 
 The integrity survey developed by Klockars et al., (2000) will be adopted for this 
study to assess ―Police Integrity‖ in these police departments (see Appendix B and C). 
The use of surveys raises validity issues associated with participants providing false data. 
The researchers will attempt to reduce these validity issues by ensuring the participants 
only provide information about attitudes and that each survey is anonymous with all 
individual information remaining confidential. 
Confidentiality 
Subject participation in this research will be completely voluntary. The survey 
will only be used in conjunction with this research project. Information concerning the 
identity of the participants will not be disclosed for any reason.  Consent forms will be 
kept in separately locked cabinets from the questionnaires and participant responses will 
be totally anonymous. Both sets of information will be in locked drawers in the office of 
Albert Gamarra, which is locked at all times, with access available to Albert Gamarra 
(see Appendix A). 
Harms and Benefits 
 This experiment does not pose any more than minimal psychological risk to 
participants. There will be no deception involved. This distress may arise from memories 
of unpleasant incidents, discomfort, possible embarrassment, as well as fears and anxiety 
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related to participation in case scenario activities. To minimize risk of exposure, 
participants will only be asked about their attitudes and furthermore will not be identified. 
These risks are outweighed by the potential benefits of the research. This research 
will further illuminate an important part of policing research. By examining ―Police 
Integrity‖ instead of corruption the study will increase surely increase honesty by 
participants in the study. By raising the participants‘ self-awareness of such behavior we 
may help prevent future participation in such activities. The benefits of this research will 
be both scholastic and practical. The study will fill gaps in the literature and assist 
policymakers by providing valuable information that will assist in increasing police 
integrity. 
Debriefing 
  Participants will be thanked for their participation and there will be no debriefing.  
Debriefing is not necessary because no deception is involved and the participants will 





Some dates to anchor these retrospective questions are: 
 
US presidents:  
G. Bush Sr. 1988-1992, Clinton: 1993 – 2000, G.W. Bush: 2001 – 2008, Obama: 2009 – Present 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TRAINING: PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE 
 
 
1. During which Presidency did your academy training for the police force take place? 
 
a. G. Bush Sr. 1988-1992    b. Clinton: 1993 – 2000 
c. G.W. Bush: 2001 – 2008     d. Obama: 2009 – Present 
e. Other 
 
Relevant Definitions: Answer the following questions using the below definitions 
 
Pedagogy: Traditional Lecture Based Training 
 
Andragogy: Self-Directed learning with the instructor playing a facilitating role. 
Instructors manage classroom and allow participants to share their experiences and 
knowledge. 
 
2. How would you describe the majority of your academy training? 
 
a. Andragogy     b. Pedagogy 
 
3. Does your department require in-service training? (If answer is NO, then skip 
questions 3a and 3b) 
 
 a. Yes      b. No 
 
3a. How often does this in-service training take place? 
 
 a. Weekly     b. Monthly 
 c. Yearly     d. Every other year 
 e. Every five years    f. Every ten years 
 
3b. How would you describe the majority of this in-service training? 
 






4. Please describe in the space below, any changes that have been made to either 
academy or in-service training since you joined the police force? Use the presidential 





5. How often do you interact with your direct supervisor? 
 
  a. Daily     b. Weekly 
  c. Monthly     d. Other 
 
5a. Which statement describes MOST of your interactions with your direct supervisor? 
 
  a. At beginning and end of shifts 
  b. During the filing of reports 
  c. At departmental meetings 
  d. During casual/friendly meetings 
 














6a. If answered YES to question 6, please explain in the space below, how and why you 
believe this change occurred. Use the presidential timeline to reference the time 






Relevant Definitions: Answer the following questions using the below definitions 
 
Traditional: The officer has little interaction with the citizens within a community. This 
is a reactive policing with little done to prevent crimes from occurring.  
 
Problem Solving Policing: Proactive rather than reactive view on crime. Involves more 
resources dedicated to understanding crimes and attempting to prevent them. 
 
Community Oriented Policing: Officers will have a zone in which to work in during 
their shifts. They work to get to know the citizens of the community. The officers 
maintain a known presence and rely on community citizens to report any suspicious 
behavior on criminals in the area. 
 
11. What policing model do you believe is most important in a police organization? 
a. Traditional    
b. Problem Solving Policing 
c. Community Policing 
 







12. What policing model do you believe your department mostly follows? 
a. Traditional    
b. Problem Solving Policing 
c. Community Policing 
 
12a. Please explain in the space below, why you believe this policing model is the one 
mostly followed by your department. 
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POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Relevant Definitions: Answer the following questions using the below definition 
 
Administrative Guidelines: Parameters of police interactions with the public 
 
Internal Affairs: Division dedicated to the investigation of incidents and plausible 
suspicions of lawbreaking and professional misconduct attributed to officers on the force 
 
Citizen Oversight Committee: Procedure under which law enforcement conduct is 
reviewed at some point by persons who are not sworn officers and normally are 
appointed by the mayor or another local elected official. 
 
Police Legal Advisor: Provides comprehensive legal advice specifically to the Division 
of Police on policies, procedures, and labor issues. Attorneys in this section also deliver 
advice to police personnel. In addition, this section tracks lawsuits, case reviews, and 
property damage/medical claims against the Division. 
 
Early Warning System: Data-based police management tool designed to identify 
officers whose behavior is problematic and provide a form of intervention to correct that 
performance. 
 
13. How often does your department update you on changes in administrative guidelines? 
a. Monthly     b. Every six months 
  c. Yearly     d. More than yearly 
  e. Never 
 
14. Who informs you of changes in administrative guidelines? 
  a. Self informed 
b. Direct supervisor     
c. Police chief 
  d. Police legal advisor 
  e. Citizen oversight Committee 
  f. Internal affairs     
g. Never informed 
h. Other, please list _________________ 
 
15. Does your department have an early warning system? 
  a. Yes 
  b. No 
  c. Do not know 
 
16. Position within Police Department? 
a. Line Officer  
b. Supervisor  





This was the police department variable recoded eliminating the 3
rd
 new agency data that 
had no corresponding data in the original dataset.  The data for the two original agencies 
were combined (N = 117) and their corresponding data for the current agencies were 
combined (N = 90). 
 
 















97% 3% 100% 
Original 
PD 




83% 17% 100% 
Total 




89% 11% 100% 
 
 
Only one question was found to be significant as it related to the police recode 
(RECODEPD) and the business variable. NBUSIMD or discipline would receive was 
found to be significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
original and current police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-
square (1) = 9.884, p < .05). More people in the current police departments felt that there 













Table 5.2: Recoded Police Department* nspeedod Crosstabulation 
  
Nspeedod 














Department 1.1% 42.0% 56.8% 100.0% 
Original PD 
Count 




Department 1.7% 60.7% 37.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




Department 1.5% 52.7% 45.9% 100.0% 
 
 
NSPEEDOD or the discipline should receive variable was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.467, p < .05). 
More officers in the current police departments (56.8%) felt that there would be a serious 
reprimand, than those in the original police departments (37.8%).  An issue to note with 





NSPEEDOR or willingness for an officer to report this behavior was found to be 
significant.  A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and 
original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 
17.711, p < .05). More officers (59.6%) in the current police departments said they would 
report this behavior, while only (46.6%) of those in the original police departments were 
likely to report this behavior. 
 




No Unsure Yes 
Recoded Police Department 
Current 
PD 
Count 13 23 53 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
14.6% 25.8% 59.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 47 15 54 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
40.5% 12.9% 46.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 60 38 107 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
29.3% 18.5% 52.2% 100.0% 
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Count 15 36 38 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
16.9% 40.4% 42.7% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 41 32 44 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
35.0% 27.4% 37.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 56 68 82 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
27.2% 33.0% 39.8% 100.0% 
 
 
NSPEEDMR or belief that other officers will report this behavior was found to be 
significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and 
original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 
9.108, p < .05). Most officers (42.7%) in the current police departments said they felt that 
fellow officers would report this behavior, while only (37.6%) of those in the original 



















Count 25 21 43 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
28.1% 23.6% 48.3% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 20 15 80 115 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
17.4% 13.0% 69.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 45 36 123 204 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
22.1% 17.6% 60.3% 100.0% 
 
 
NHOLIVI or belief that this behavior would violate official policy in your agency was 
significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and 
original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 
9.527, p < .05). More officers (28.1%) in the current police departments said they felt that 
the behavior would not violate official police policy, when (17.4%) compared to those in 




NHOLIMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 17.873, p < .05). 
More officers (64%) in the current police departments said they felt that there would be 
no reprimand for this behavior, while only (34.5%) of those in the original police 
departments felt that there would be no reprimand for this behavior. An issue to note with 
this finding was that 33.3% percent of the cells had counts less than 5. 















Count 57 29 3 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
64.0% 32.6% 3.4% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 40 71 5 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
34.5% 61.2% 4.3% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 97 100 8 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
47.3% 48.8% 3.9% 100.0% 
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Count 0 9 80 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
0.0% 10.1% 89.9% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 1 39 76 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
0.9% 33.6% 65.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 1 48 156 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
0.5% 23.4% 76.1% 100.0% 
 
 
NBURGOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 16.584, p < .05). 
More officers (89.9%) in the current police departments said they felt that there should be 
a serious reprimand for this behavior, while only (65.5%) of those in the original police 
departments were likely to say that they felt that there should be a serious reprimand for 
this behavior.  An issue to note with this finding was that 33.3% percent of the cells had 
counts less than 5. 
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Count 0 14 75 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
0.0% 15.7% 84.3% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 1 40 76 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
0.9% 34.2% 65.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 1 54 151 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
0.5% 26.2% 73.3% 100.0% 
 
 
NBURGMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.902, p < .05). 
More officers in the current police departments (84.3%) said they felt that there would be 
a serious reprimand for this behavior, while only (65.0%) of those officers in the original 
police departments were likely to say there would be a serious reprimand for this 
behavior. An issue to note with this finding was that 33.3% percent of the cells had counts 
less than 5. 
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Count 7 9 73 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
7.9% 10.1% 82.0% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 29 20 67 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
25.0% 17.2% 57.8% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 36 29 140 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
17.6% 14.1% 68.3% 100.0% 
 
NBURGOR or willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 14.571, p < .05). 
More officers (82.0%) in the current police departments said that they were willing to 
report this behavior, while only (57.8%) of officers in the original police departments 













Count 9 23 57 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
10.1% 25.8% 64.0% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 31 24 60 115 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
27.0% 20.9% 52.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 40 47 117 204 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
19.6% 23.0% 57.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NBURGMR or willingness of other officers to report this behavior was found to be 
significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and 
original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 
9.031, p < .05). More officers (64%) in the current police departments said that officers in 
their departments were willing to report this behavior, while only (52.2%) of officers in 
the original police departments said they were willing to report this behavior. 
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Count 1 89 90 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
1.1% 98.9% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 15 102 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
12.8% 87.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 16 191 207 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
7.7% 92.3% 100.0% 
 
 
NAUTOOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 9.779, p < .05). 
More officers (98.9%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior 
was serious, while only (87.2%) of officers in the original police departments said they 
felt the behavior was serious. 
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Count 5 85 90 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
5.6% 94.4% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 19 98 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
16.2% 83.8% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 24 183 207 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
11.6% 88.4% 100.0% 
 
NAUTOMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.665, p < .05). 
More officers (94.4%) in the current police departments said that they felt their fellow 
officers were likely to say the behavior was serious, while only (83.8%) of officers in the 
original police departments said they felt the fellow officers were likely to say that the 
behavior was serious. 
 139 
 















Count 6 46 38 90 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 6.7% 51.1% 42.2% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 17 77 23 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 14.5% 65.8% 19.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 23 123 61 207 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 11.1% 59.4% 29.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NAUTOOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of 
independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 13.470, p < .05). More officers 
(42.2%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior should receive a 
serious reprimand, while only (19.7%) of officers in the original police departments said 


















Count 5 48 37 90 
% within Recoded 
Police 
Department 5.6% 53.3% 41.1% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 12 77 28 117 
% within Recoded 
Police 
Department 10.3% 65.8% 23.9% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 17 125 65 207 
% within Recoded 
Police 
Department 8.2% 60.4% 31.4% 100.0% 
 
NAUTOMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of 
independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.462, p < .05). More officers (41.1%) 
in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior would receive a serious 
reprimand, while only (23.9%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt 




Table 5.15: Crosstab 
  
nautoor 





Count 18 21 51 90 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 20.0% 23.3% 56.7% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 53 22 41 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 45.7% 19.0% 35.3% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 71 43 92 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 34.5% 20.9% 44.7% 100.0% 
 
 
NAUTOOR or own willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of 
independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 15.326, p < .05). More officers 
(56.7%) in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while 




Table 5.16: Crosstab 
  
nautomr 





Count 19 30 41 90 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 21.1% 33.3% 45.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 49 31 36 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 42.2% 26.7% 31.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 68 61 77 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 33.0% 29.6% 37.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NAUTOMR or others willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test 
of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments 
and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 15.326, p < .05). More officers 
(45.6%) in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while 
















Count 4 86 90 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
4.4% 95.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 18 99 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
15.4% 84.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 22 185 207 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
10.6% 89.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPEROS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 6.410, p < .05). 
More officers (95.6%) in the current police departments said that they would find this 
behavior serious, while only (84.6%) of officers in the original police departments said 















Count 7 83 90 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
7.8% 92.2% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 25 92 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
21.4% 78.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 32 175 207 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
15.5% 84.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPERMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 7.188, p < .05). 
More officers (92.2%) in the current police departments said that they believed other 
officers would find this behavior serious, while only (78.6%) of officers in the original 



















Count 9 55 25 89 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 10.1% 61.8% 28.1% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 29 68 19 116 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 25.0% 58.6% 16.4% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 38 123 44 205 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 18.5% 60.0% 21.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPEROD or discipline should receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of 
independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.324, p < .05). More officers (28.1%) 
in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior should receive a serious 
reprimand, while only (16.4%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt 




Table 5.20: Crosstab 
  
nsupermd 










Count 13 55 21 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 14.6% 61.8% 23.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 33 68 16 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 28.2% 58.1% 13.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 46 123 37 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 22.3% 59.7% 18.0% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPERMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test of 
independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.070, p < .05). More officers (23.6%) 
in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior would receive a serious 
reprimand, while only (13.7%) of officers in the original police departments said they felt 
the behavior would receive a serious reprimand. 
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Table 5.21: Crosstab 
  
nsuperor 





Count 25 20 44 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 28.1% 22.5% 49.4% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 57 25 35 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 48.7% 21.4% 29.9% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 82 45 79 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 39.8% 21.8% 38.3% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPEROR or own willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test 
of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments 
and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 10.456, p < .05). More officers 
(49.4%) in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while 





Table 5.22: Crosstab 
  
nsupermr 





Count 25 27 37 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 28.1% 30.3% 41.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 53 31 33 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 45.3% 26.5% 28.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 78 58 70 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 37.9% 28.2% 34.0% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPERMR or others willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test 
of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments 
and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.877, p < .05). More officers 
(41.6%) in the current police departments said that they felt others would report this 
behavior, while only (28.2%) of officers in the original police departments said that they 















Count 25 64 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
28.1% 71.9% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 57 59 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
49.1% 50.9% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 82 123 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
 
 
NALCHOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 9.296, p < .05). 
More officers (71.9%) in the current police departments said that they would find this 
behavior serious, while only (50.9%) of officers in the original police departments said 















Count 36 53 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
40.4% 59.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 66 51 117 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
56.4% 43.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 102 104 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
49.5% 50.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NALCHMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.151, p < .05). 
More officers (59.6%) in the current police departments said that they believed other 
officers would find this behavior serious, while only (43.6%) of officers in the original 


















Count 9 6 74 89 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 10.1% 6.7% 83.1% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 22 19 76 117 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 18.8% 16.2% 65.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 31 25 150 206 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 15.0% 12.1% 72.8% 100.0% 
 
 
NALCHVI or belief that this behavior would violate official policy in your agency was 
significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and 
original police departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 
8.591, p < .05). More people (83.1%) in the current police departments said they felt that 
the behavior did violate official police policy, while only (65.0%) of officers in the 





Table 5.26: Crosstab 
  
nbaror 





Count 35 13 41 89 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 39.3% 14.6% 46.1% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 64 21 31 116 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 55.2% 18.1% 26.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 99 34 72 205 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 48.3% 16.6% 35.1% 100.0% 
 
 
NBAROR or own willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test of 
independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.355, p < .05). More officers (46.1%) 
in the current police departments said that they would report this behavior, while only 






Table 5.27: Crosstab 
  
nbarmr 




Count 38 23 28 89 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 42.7% 25.8% 31.5% 100.0% 
Original PD 
Count 71 21 24 116 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 61.2% 18.1% 20.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 109 44 52 205 
% within 
Recoded Police 
Department 53.2% 21.5% 25.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NBARMR or others willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square test 
of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments 
and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.954, p < .05). More officers 
(31.5%) in the current police departments said that they thought fellow officers would 
report this behavior, while only (20.7%) of officers in the original police departments felt 
















Count 18 72 90 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 38 78 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
32.8% 67.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 56 150 206 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
27.2% 72.8% 100.0% 
 
 
NFORCEOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 4.168, p < .05). 
More officers (80.0%) in the current police departments felt the behavior was serious, 

















Count 3 86 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
3.4% 96.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 14 102 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
12.1% 87.9% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 17 188 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 
8.3% 91.7% 100.0% 
 
NWALLETMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.010, p < .05). 
More officers (96.6%) in the current police departments said that they believed other 
officers would find this behavior serious, while only (87.9%) of officers in the original 




Table 5.30: Crosstab 
  
nwalletod 










Count 2 42 45 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 2.2% 47.2% 50.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 11 69 36 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 9.5% 59.5% 31.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 13 111 81 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 6.3% 54.1% 39.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NWALLETOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant. A chi-square test 
of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police departments 
and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 10.423, p < .05). More officers 
(50.6%) in the current police departments said that they felt the behavior should receive a 
serious reprimand, while only (31.0%) of officers in the original police departments said 




Table 5.31: Crosstab 
  
nwalletor 





Count 17 19 53 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 19.1% 21.3% 59.6% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 42 21 53 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 36.2% 18.1% 45.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 59 40 106 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 28.8% 19.5% 51.7% 100.0% 
 
NWALLETOR or own willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square 
test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.263, p < .05). 
More officers (53%) in the current police departments said that they would report this 
behavior, while only (45.7%) of officers in the original police departments said that they 




Table 5.32: Crosstab 
  
nwalletmr 





Count 23 27 39 89 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 25.8% 30.3% 43.8% 100.0% 
Original 
PD 
Count 50 29 37 116 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 43.1% 25.0% 31.9% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 73 56 76 205 
% within Recoded 
Police Department 35.6% 27.3% 37.1% 100.0% 
 
 
NWALLETMR or others willingness to report was found to be significant. A chi-square 
test of independence was calculated comparing the current and original police 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.670, p < .05). 
More officers (43.8%) in the current police departments said that felt their fellow officers 
would report this behavior, while only (31.9%) of officers in the original police 
departments said that they felt their fellow officers would report this behavior. 
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Business N N N N X N N 
Meal N N N N N N N 
Speed N N N X N X  X 
Holiday N N X N X N N 
Burglary N N N X X X X 
Auto X  X N X X X X 
Supervisor X X N X X X X 
Alcohol X X X N N N N 
Bar N N N N N X X 
Force X  N N N N N N 
Wallet N X N X N X X 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 
N = Non-Significant Variables 
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ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES 
Administrative guidelines recode: This variable was calculated to give an estimate of how 
current officers are as it relates to being informed of departmental guidelines. It was 
recoded to a binary format where officers were identified as either having been informed 
of changes to the administrative guidelines within the last year or having been informed 
in a period which is more than a year. 

















recode 25.4% 10.2% 64.4% 100.0% 
more than 
a year 




recode 13.2% 28.9% 57.9% 100.0% 
Total 




recode 20.6% 17.5% 61.9% 100.0% 
 
 
NMEALSVI or violation of policy was found to be significant for guidelines recode. A 
chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing those who were informed of 
guidelines changes more than once a year and those who were informed less than once a 
year. A significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.495, p < .05). Those who 
had been informed of administrative guidelines in less than a year (25.4%) were more 
likely to believe it was a violation of policy than those who had not been informed of 




Table 6.2: Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for 
adminguidelines 















Business N N N N N N N 
Meal N N X N N N N 
Speed N N N N N N N 
Holiday N N N N N N N 
Burglary N N N N N N N 
Auto N N N N N N N 
Supervisor N N N N N N N 
Alcohol N N N N N N N 
Bar N N N N N N N 
Force N N N N N N N 
Wallet N N N N N N N 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 
N = Non-Significant Variables 
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Time period of service by Presidency: This variable was calculated to give an estimate of 
time of service. It was recoded to a binary format where officers were identified by Pre- 
2001 and Post- 2001 period by which they entered service. 
 








Count 29 57 86 
% within 
recodepresident 33.7% 66.3% 100.0% 
Post 
2001 
Count 16 11 27 
% within 
recodepresident 59.3% 40.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 45 68 113 
% within 
recodepresident 39.8% 60.2% 100.0% 
 
NMEALSOS or own view of seriousness for behavior was found to be significant for 
time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction 
was found (chi-square (1) = 5.592, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-2001 (66.3%) 
were more likely to find the behavior serious than those that entered post-2001 (40.7%).
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0 29 57 86 
% within 
recodepresident 




1 14 10 25 
% within 
recodepresident 
4.0% 56.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 
1 43 67 111 
% within 
recodepresident 
0.9% 38.7% 60.4% 100.0% 
NSPEEDOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant for 
time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction 
was found (chi-square (2) = 8.138, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-2001 (66.3%) 




Table 7.3: Crosstab 
  
nspeedor 




Count 7 14 65 86 
% within 
recodepresident 
8.1% 16.3% 75.6% 100.0% 
Post 
2001 
Count 6 10 10 26 
% within 
recodepresident 
23.1% 38.5% 38.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 13 24 75 112 
% within 
recodepresident 
11.6% 21.4% 67.0% 100.0% 
NSPEEDOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction 
was found (chi-square (2) = 12.530, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-2001 







Table 7.4 Crosstab 
  
nspeedmr 
Total No Unsure Yes 
recodepresident 
Pre 2001 
Count 9 23 54 86 
% within 
recodepresident 
10.5% 26.7% 62.8% 100.0% 
Post  
2001 
Count 5 14 7 26 
% within 
recodepresident 
19.2% 53.8% 26.9% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 14 37 61 112 
% within 
recodepresident 
12.5% 33.0% 54.5% 100.0% 
NSPEEDMR or others willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant 
for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was 
calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant 
interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 10.382, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-
2001 (62.8%) were more likely to feel others would report this behavior than those that 




Table 7.5: Crosstab 
  
nholior 




Count 49 16 20 85 
% within 
recodepresident 
57.6% 18.8% 23.5% 100.0% 
Post 
2001 
Count 23 3 1 27 
% within 
recodepresident 
85.2% 11.1% 3.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 72 19 21 112 
% within 
recodepresident 
64.3% 17.0% 18.8% 100.0% 
NHOLIOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for 
time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction 
was found (chi-square (2) = 7.431, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-2001 (23.5%) 














Count 4 81 85 
% within 
recodepresident 4.7% 95.3% 100.0% 
Post  
2001 
Count 6 21 27 
% within 
recodepresident 22.2% 77.8% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 10 102 112 
% within 
recodepresident 8.9% 91.1% 100.0% 
NBURGOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant for 
time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction 
was found (chi-square (1) = 7.732, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-2001 (95.3%) 
were more likely to feel that this behavior should receive a serious reprimand than those 
that entered post-2001 (77.8%).  An issue to note with this finding was that 25% of the 




Table 7.7: Crosstab 
  
nburgor 
Total No Unsure Yes 
recodepresident 
Pre 2001 
Count 2 6 77 85 
% within 
recodepresident 
2.4% 7.1% 90.6% 100.0% 
Post 
2001 
Count 5 3 19 27 
% within 
recodepresident 
18.5% 11.1% 70.4% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 7 9 96 112 
% within 
recodepresident 
6.3% 8.0% 85.7% 100.0% 
NBURGOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for 
time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction 
was found (chi-square (2) = 9.964, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-2001 (90.6%) 




Table 7.8: Crosstab 
  
nautoor 




Count 8 16 62 86 
% within 
recodepresident 
9.3% 18.6% 72.1% 100.0% 
Post 
2001 
Count 10 5 12 27 
% within 
recodepresident 
37.0% 18.5% 44.4% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 18 21 74 113 
% within 
recodepresident 
15.9% 18.6% 65.5% 100.0% 
NAUTOOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant for 
time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant interaction 
was found (chi-square (2) = 12.322, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-2001 





Table 7.9: Crosstab 
  
nforceor 
Total No Unsure Yes 
recodepresident 
Pre 2001 
Count 28 16 40 84 
% within 
recodepresident 
33.3% 19.0% 47.6% 100.0% 
Post  
2001 
Count 18 3 6 27 
% within 
recodepresident 
66.7% 11.1% 22.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 46 19 46 111 
% within 
recodepresident 
41.4% 17.1% 41.4% 100.0% 
NFORCEOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant 
for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was 
calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant 
interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.410, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-



















0 33 52 85 
% within 
recodepresident 
0.0% 38.8% 61.2% 100.0% 
Post 2001 
Count 
2 14 11 27 
% within 
recodepresident 
7.4% 51.9% 40.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 
2 47 63 112 
% within 
recodepresident 
1.8% 42.0% 56.3% 100.0% 
NWALLETOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant 
for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was 
calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant 
interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.646, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-
2001 (61.2%) were more likely to recommend a serious reprimand for this behavior than 




Table 7.11: Crosstab 
  
nwalletor 
Total No Unsure Yes 
Recodepresident 
Pre 2001 
Count 8 11 66 85 
% within 
recodepresident 
9.4% 12.9% 77.6% 100.0% 
Post 
 2001 
Count 9 8 10 27 
% within 
recodepresident 
33.3% 29.6% 37.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 17 19 76 112 
% within 
recodepresident 
15.2% 17.0% 67.9% 100.0% 
NWALLETOR or own willingness to report for this behavior was found to be significant 
for time period of service by presidency. A chi-square test of independence was 
calculated comparing pre-2001 and post- 2001 date entered into service and a significant 
interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 16.069, p < .05). Those who entered service pre-
2001 (77.6%) were more likely to report this behavior than those that entered post-2001 
(37.0%). 
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Business N N N N N N N 
Meal X N N N N N N 
Speed N N N X N X  X 
Holiday N N N N N X N 
Burglary N N N X N X N 
Auto N N N N N X N 
Supervisor N N N N N N N 
Alcohol N N N N N N N 
Bar N N N N N N N 
Force X  N N N N X N 
Wallet N N N X N X N 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 




















Count 1 19 18 38 
% within Position 
within police 
department 2.6% 50.0% 47.4% 100.0% 
supervisor 
Count 0 14 40 54 
% within Position 
within police 
department 0.0% 25.9% 74.1% 100.0% 
Other 
Count 0 9 8 17 
% within Position 
within police 
department 0.0% 52.9% 47.1% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 1 42 66 109 
% within Position 
within police 
department .9% 38.5% 60.6% 100.0% 
 
 
NSPEEDOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant for officer position. 
A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 9.541, p < .05). Supervisors (74.1%) 
were more likely to feel the discipline that should be received was a serious reprimand 
than those who were line officers (33.3%). An issue to note with this finding was that 




Table 8.2: Crosstab 
  
nspeedor 









department 20.5% 28.2% 51.3% 100.0% 
supervisor 




department 1.9% 13.0% 85.2% 100.0% 
other 




department 11.8% 29.4 58.8% 100.0% 
Total 




department 10.0% 20.9% 69.1% 100.0% 
 
 
NSPEEDOR or own willingness to report the behavior was found to be significant for 
officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer 
position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 15.234, p < .05). Those 
who were supervisors (85.2%) were more likely to report the behavior than those who 
were line officers (51.3%). An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells 







Table 8.3: Position within police department* nburgor Crosstabulation 
  
nburgor 












department  12.5% 7.5% 80.0% 100.0% 
Supervisors 
Count 




department  0.0% 5.7% 94.3% 100.0% 
Other 
Count 




department  0.0% 17.6% 82.4% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department  4.5% 8.2% 87.3% 100.0% 
 
 
NBURGOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer 
position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 11.639, p < .05). Those 
who were supervisors (94.3%) were more likely to report the behavior than line officers 










Not Serious Serious 
Position within police 
department 
line officer 





35.0% 65.0% 100.0% 
supervisor 





45.3% 54.7% 100.0% 
other 





5.9% 94.1% 100.0% 
Total 





35.5% 64.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NALCHMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer 
position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.737, p < .05). Those 
who were line officers (65.0%) were more likely to believe the behavior was serious than 









Not Serious Serious 
Position within police 
department 
line officer 






32.5% 67.5% 100.0% 
supervisor 






5.6% 94.4% 100.0% 
other 






6.3% 93.8% 100.0% 
Total 






15.5% 84.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NFORCEOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer 
position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 13.982, p < .05). Those 
who were supervisors (94.4%) were more likely to believe the behavior was serious than 

























department 42.5% 50.0% 7.5% 100.0% 
supervisor 




department 9.4% 75.5% 15.1% 100.0% 
other 




department 25.0% 75.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 




department 23.9% 66.1% 10.1% 100.0% 
 
NFORCEOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant for officer position. 
A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer position and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 16.121, p < .05). Those who were 
supervisors (75.5%) were more likely to feel the discipline should receive a moderate 
reprimand than those who were line officers (50.0%). An issue to note with this finding 




Table 8.7: Crosstab 
  
nforceor 





Count 22 8 10 40 
% within Position 
within police 
department 55.0% 20.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
supervisor 
Count 14 7 32 53 
% within Position 
within police 
department 26.4% 13.2% 60.4% 100.0% 
other 
Count 7 4 5 16 
% within Position 
within police 
department 43.8% 25.0% 31.3% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 43 19 47 109 
% within Position 
within police 
department 39.4 17.4% 43.1% 100.0% 
  
    
 
NFORCEOR or own willingness to report the behavior was found to be significant for 
officer position. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing officer 
position and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.258, p < .05). Those 




















Business N N N N N N N 
Meal N N N N N N N 
Speed N N N X N X N 
Holiday N N N N N N N 
Burglary N N N N N X N 
Auto N N N N N N N 
Supervisor N N N N N N N 
Alcohol N X N N N N N 
Bar N N N N N N N 
Force X N N X N X N 
Wallet N N N N N N N 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 

















Count 1 17 18 
% within Describe 
Majority of academy 
training 
5.6% 94.4% 100.0% 
Pedagogy 
Count 0 96 96 
% within Describe 
Majority of academy 
training 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 1 113 114 
% within Describe 
Majority of academy 
training 
.9% 99.1% 100.0% 
 
 
NAUTOOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
training. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and 
a significant interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.381, p < .05). Those taught in a 
Pedagogy (100%) style were more likely to feel the case was serious when compared to 
those in an Andragogy (94.4%) style. An issue to note with this finding was that 50% of 









No Violation of 












training 5.6% 33.3% 61.1% 100.0% 
Pedagogy 





training 2.1% 6.3% 91.7% 100.0% 
Total 





training 2.6% 10.5% 86.8% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPERVI or violation of policy variable was found to be significant for training. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a significant 
interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 12.887, p < .05). Those who trained under the 
pedagogy method (91.7%) were more likely to believe there was a violation of policy 
than those that trained under the andragogy method (61.1%). An issue to note with this 






















training 27.8% 0.0% 72.2% 100.0% 
Pedagogy 




training 8.4% 7.4% 84.2% 100.0% 
Total 




training 11.5% 6.2% 82.3% 100.0% 
 
 
NALCHVI or violation of policy variable was found to be significant for training. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a significant 
interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.519, p < .05). Those who trained under the 
pedagogy method (84.2%) were more likely to believe there was a violation of policy 
than those that trained under the andragogy method (72.2%). An issue to note with this 
























16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Pedagogy 






3.2% 96.8% 100.0% 
Total 






5.4% 94.6% 100.0% 
 
 
NBARVI or violation of policy variable was found to be significant for training. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a significant 
interaction was found (chi-square (1) = 5.410, p < .05). Those who trained under the 
pedagogy method (96.8%) were more likely to believe that there was a violation of policy 
than those that trained under the andragogy method (83.3%). An issue to note with this 







NWALLETMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant for training. A 
chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing type of training and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.599, p < .05). Those who trained 
under the andragogy method (83.3%) were more likely to believe there would be a 
serious reprimand for this behavior than those that trained under the pedagogy method 
(43.6%). An issue to note with this finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 
5. 











of academy training 
Andragogy 
Count 
0 3 15 18 
% within Describe 
Majority of academy 
training 0.0% 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Pedagogy 
Count 
3 50 41 94 
% within Describe 
Majority of academy 
training 3.2% 53.2% 43.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 
3 53 56 112 
% within Describe 
Majority of academy 
training 2.7% 47.3% 50.0% 100.0% 
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Table 9.6: Summary table for significant and non-significant variables for 
academytraining 
 















Business N N N N N N N 
Meal N N N N N N N 
Speed N N N N N N N 
Holiday N N N N N N N 
Burglary N N N N N N N 
Auto X N N N N N N 
Supervisor N N X N N N N 
Alcohol N N X N N N N 
Bar N N X N N N N 
Force N N N N N N N 
Wallet N N N N X N N 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 
N = Non-Significant Variables  
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POST ACADEMY TRAINING 

















Business N N N N N N N 
Meal N N N N N N N 
Speed N N N N N N N 
Holiday N N N N N N N 
Burglary N N N N N N N 
Auto N N N N N N N 
Supervisor N N N N N N N 
Alcohol N N N N N N N 
Bar N N N N N N N 
Force N N N N N N N 
Wallet N N N N N N N 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 
N = Non-Significant Variables 
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EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
 
Table 11.1: Does department have early warning system* nmealsmr Crosstabulation 
  
nmealsmr 







Count 8 5 2 15 
% within Does department 
have early warning system 
53.3% 33.3% 13.3% 100.0% 
no 
Count 50 5 3 58 
% within Does department 
have early warning system 
86.2% 8.6% 5.2% 100.0% 
do not know 
Count 26 3 0 29 
% within Does department 
have early warning system 
89.7% 10.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 84 13 5 102 
% within Does department 
have early warning system 
82.4% 12.7% 4.9% 100.0% 
 
 
NMEALSMR or willingness for others to report this behavior was found to be significant 
with early warning system. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing 
the those who stated their department had an early warning system and those who stated 
their department did not have an early warning system and a significant interaction was 
found (chi-square (2) = 11.326, p < .05). Those who did not have an early warning 
system (86.2%) were more likely to feel officers in their department would not report the 
behavior; against those that did have an early warning system (53.3%) felt officers in 
their department would not report the behavior.  An issue to note with this finding was 









NHOLIMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-
square test of independence was calculated comparing the those who stated their 
department had an early warning system and those who stated their department did not 
have an early warning system and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 
8.784, p < .05). Those officers (68.8%) in departments with early warning systems were 
more likely to feel other officers in their department would find the behavior serious, 
while those officers (46.6%) in departments without early warning systems were less 
likely to feel officers in their department would find this case serious. 
 











Count 5 11 16 
% within Does 
department have early 
warning system 
31.3% 68.8% 100.0% 
no 
Count 31 27 58 
% within Does 
department have early 
warning system 
53.4% 46.6% 100.0% 
do not know 
Count 22 7 29 
% within Does 
department have early 
warning system 
75.9% 24.1% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 58 45 103 
% within Does 
department have early 
warning system 




Table 11.3: Does department have early warning system* nbarmr Crosstabulation 
  
nbarmr 







Count 1 6 9 16 
% within Does department 
have early warning system 
6.3% 37.5% 56.3% 100.0% 
No 
Count 24 15 17 56 
% within Does department 
have early warning system 
42.9% 26.8% 30.4% 100.0% 
do not 
know 
Count 15 4 10 29 
% within Does department 
have early warning system 
51.7% 13.8% 34.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 40 25 36 101 
% within Does department 
have early warning system 
39.6% 24.8% 35.6% 100.0% 
 
 
NBARMR or believe other officers would report this behavior was found to be 
significant. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing those who stated 
their department did not have an early warning system and a significant interaction was 
found (chi-square (4) = 10.627, p < .05). Those officers (42.9%) that had no early 
warning system at their department said they were more likely to feel officers at their 
department would not report the behavior, than officers (6.3%) at departments with an 















Count 0 15 15 
% within Does 
department have early 
warning system 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
No 
Count 20 38 58 
% within Does 
department have early 
warning system 
34.5% 65.5% 100.0% 
do not know 
Count 9 20 29 
% within Does 
department have early 
warning system 
31.0% 69.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 29 73 102 
% within Does 
department have early 
warning system 
28.4% 71.6% 100.0% 
 
 
NFORCEMS or others seriousness of behavior was found to be significant. A chi-square 
test of independence was calculated comparing those who stated their department did not 
have an early warning system and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 
7.099, p < .05). Those who said their agency had no early warning system felt the 
behavior was not serious (34.5%), while no one (0%) at agencies with an early warning 
system felt the behavior was not serious. 
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Business N N N N N N N 
Meal N N N N N N X  
Speed N N N N N N N 
Holiday N X N N N N N 
Burglary N N N N N N N 
Auto N N N N N N N 
Supervisor N N N N N N N 
Alcohol N N N N N N N 
Bar N N N N N N X 
Force N X N N N N N 
Wallet N N N N N N N 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 
N = Non-Significant Variables 
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POLICE MODEL 















Count 63 6 69 
% within Police model 
believe your department 
mostly follows 
91.3% 8.7% 100.0% 
problem solving 
policing 
Count 23 3 26 
% within Police model 
believe your department 
mostly follows 
88.5% 11.5% 100.0% 
community policing 
Count 9 2 11 
% within Police model 
believe your department 
mostly follows 
81.8% 18.2% 100.0% 
all of the above 
Count 0 1 1 
% within Police model 
believe your department 
mostly follows 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 95 12 107 
% within Police model 
believe your department 
mostly follows 
88.8% 11.2% 100.0% 
 
 
NBUSINMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
Police Model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing 
police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (3) = 8.895, p < .05). 
Those who were in departments that had a traditional policing model (91.3%) were more 
likely to believe the behavior was not serious, than those in a community policing model 
(81.8%) and problem solving policing model (88.5%). An issue to note with this finding 
was that 50% percent of the cells had counts less than 5. 
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Count 64 4 1 69 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 




Count 24 2 1 27 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 
mostly follows 88.9% 7.4% 3.7% 100.0% 
community 
policing 
Count 9 1 1 11 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 
mostly follows 81.8% 9.1% 9.1% 100.0% 
all of the 
above 
Count 0 1 0 1 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 
mostly follows 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 97 8 3 108 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 
mostly follows 89.8% 7.4% 2.8% 100.0% 
 
     
 
 
NBUSINVI or the violation of policy variable was found to be significant for police 
model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police 
model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (6) = 15.031, p < .05). Those in 
a traditional policing model (92.8%) were more likely to feel there was no violation of 
policy when compared to those in the problem solving policing (88.9%) and community 
policing model (81.8%). An issue to note with this finding was that 66% of the cells had 






NHOLIOS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing 
police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (3) = 8.609, p < .05). 
Those who were in departments that had a traditional policing model (54.4%) were more 
likely to report the behavior as not serious, than those in problem solving policing  
(25.9%) and community policing models (27.3%). An issue to note with this finding was 


















Count 37 31 68 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 




Count 7 20 27 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 
25.9% 74.1% 100.0% 
community 
policing 
Count 3 8 11 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 
27.3 72.7% 100.0% 
all of the 
above 
Count 0 1 1 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 47 60 107 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 





NHOLIMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing 
police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (3) = 11.147, p < .05). 
Those who were in departments that had a traditional policing model (67.6%) were more 
likely to report the behavior as not serious, than those in problem solving policing  
(33.3%) and community policing models (45.5%). An issue to note with this finding was 
that 37.5% of the cells had counts of less than 5. 













Count 46 22 68 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 




Count 9 18 27 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
community 
policing 
Count 5 6 11 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 
45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 
all of the 
above 
Count 0 1 1 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 60 47 107 
% within Police 
model believe your 
department mostly 
follows 
56.1% 43.9% 100.0% 
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follows 25.9% 7.4% 66.7% 100.0% 
community 
policing 






follows 9.1% 0.0% 90.9% 100.0% 
all of the 
above 






follows 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 




Department 27.7% 24.1% 56.1% 100.0% 
 
 
NHOLIVI or violation of policy variable was found to be significant for police model of 
department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing police model 
and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (6) = 14.938, p < .05). Those who 
were in a traditional policing model (27.9%) and problem solving policing model 
(25.9%) were more likely to believe this scenario did not violated policy than those in a 
community policing model (9.1%). An issue to note with this finding was that 41.8% of 
the cells had counts of less than 5. 
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Table 12.6: Crosstab 
  
nholimr 







Count 55 7 6 68 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 




Count 14 8 5 27 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 
mostly follows 51.9% 29.6% 18.5% 100.0% 
community 
policing 
Count 6 1 4 11 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 
mostly follows 54.5 9.1% 36.4% 100.0% 
all of the 
above 
Count 0 1 0 1 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 
mostly follows 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 75 17 15 107 
% within Police 
model believe 
your department 
mostly follows 70.1% 15.9% 14.0% 100.0% 
 
NHOLIMR or do you believe others in your department would report this behavior was 
found to be significant for police model of department. A chi-square test of independence 
was calculated comparing police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-
square (6) = 18.570, p < .05). Those who were in a traditional policing model (80.9%) 
were more likely to not believe others in their department would report the behavior than 
those in the problem solving policing model (51.9%) and community policing model 

















Count 10 58 68 




14.7% 85.3% 100.0% 
problem solving 
policing 
Count 7 20 27 




25.9% 74.1% 100.0% 
community 
policing 
Count 0 11 11 




0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
all of the above 
Count 1 0 1 




100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 18 89 107 




16.8% 83.2% 100.0% 
 
 
NFORCEOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
police model of department. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing 
police model and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (3) = 8.986, p < .05). 
Those who were in a problem solving policing model (25.9%) were more likely to find 
the behavior not serious, while those in a traditional (14.7%) and community policing 
model (0.00%). An issue to note with this finding was that 50% of all cells had counts of 
less than 5. 
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Business N X X N N N N 
Meal N N N N N N N 
Speed N N N N N N N 
Holiday X X X N N N X 
Burglary N N N N N N N 
Auto N N N N N N N 
Supervisor N N N N N N N 
Alcohol N N N N N N N 
Bar N N N N N N N 
Force X N N N N N N 
Wallet N N N N  N N N 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 




Table 13.1: Family member officer prior  to you joining  the force* nmealsmr Crosstabulation 
  
nmealsmr 
Total No Unsure Yes 
Family 
member 
officer prior  
to you 
joining  the 
force Yes 
Count 43 12 0 55 
% within Family 
member officer prior  
to you joining  the 
force 78.2% 21.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
No 
Count 48 3 6 57 
% within Family 
member officer prior  
to you joining  the 
force 84.2% 5.3% 10.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 91 15 6 112 
% within Family 
member officer prior  
to you joining  the 




NMEALSMR or willingness for others to report this behavior was found to be significant 
for family member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was 
calculated comparing those that had a family member in the police force prior to joining 
and those that did not. A significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 11.643, p < 
.05). Those officers (84.2%) that had no family in the force prior to joining were more 
likely to believe others were not going to report this behavior, than those officers (78.2%) 
who did have a family member in the force prior to joining. An issue to note with this 





Table 13.2: Crosstab 
  
nspeedmd 
Total No Reprimand 
Moderate 













officer prior  to 
you joining  
the force 1.8% 60.0% 38.2% 100.0% 
no 




officer prior  to 
you joining  
the force 1.8% 35.1% 63.2% 100.0% 
Total 




officer prior  to 
you joining  
the force 1.8% 47.3% 50.9% 100.0% 
 
 
    
 
 
NSPEEDMD or discipline would receive was found to be significant for family member 
was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing 
those that had a family member in the police force prior to joining and those that did not. 
A significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.103, p < .05). Those who said they 
had no family in the force (63.2%) were more likely to feel there would be a serious 
reprimand than those who had family in the force (38.2%) prior to joining themselves. An 






Table 13.3: Family member officer prior  to you joining  the force* nburgor Crosstabulation 
  
nburgor 
Total No Unsure Yes 
Family 
member 
officer prior  
to you joining  
the force 
yes 
Count 4 8 43 55 
% within Family 
member officer 
prior  to you 
joining  the force 7.3% 14.5% 78.2% 100.0% 
no 
Count 3 1 53 57 
% within Family 
member officer 
prior  to you 
joining  the force 5.3% 1.8% 93.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 7 9 96 112 
% within Family 
member officer 
prior  to you 
joining  the force 6.3% 8.0% 85.7% 100.0% 
 
 
NBURGOR or willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for family 
member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing those that had a family member in the police force prior to joining and those 
that did not. A significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.595, p > .05).  Those 
who had family in the force were more likely to be unsure while those that did not were 
more likely to report. An issue to note with this finding was that 66% of the cells had 







NALCHOR or willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant with family 
member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing the those who did/did not have a family member in the police force and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.187, p < .05). Those who had a 
family member in the police force (72.7%) were more likely to not report this behavior 
than those that had a family member (50.9%) in the police force. 
 
Table 13.4: Crosstab 
  
nalchor 










Count 40 6 9 55 
% within Family member 
officer prior  to you joining  the 
force 72.7% 10.9% 16.4% 100.0% 
no 
Count 29 8 20 57 
% within Family member 
officer prior  to you joining  the 
force 50.9% 14.0% 35.1% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 69 14 29 112 
% within Family member 
officer prior  to you joining  the 
force 61.6% 12.5% 25.9% 100.0% 
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Table 13.5: Crosstab 
  
nalchmr 
Total No Unsure Yes 
Family 
member 
officer prior  
to you 
joining  the 
force yes 
Count 45 7 3 55 
% within Family 
member officer prior  
to you joining  the 
force 81.8% 12.7% 5.5% 100.0% 
no 
Count 33 14 10 57 
% within Family 
member officer prior  
to you joining  the 
force 57.9% 24.6% 17.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 78 21 13 112 
% within Family 
member officer prior  
to you joining  the 
force 69.6% 18.8% 11.6% 100.0% 
 
 
NALCHMR or willingness for others to report this behavior was found to be significant 
with family member was/was not a police officer. A chi-square test of independence was 
calculated comparing the those who did/did not have a family member in the police force 
and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.916, p < .05). Those that had a 
family member (81.8%) in the police force were more likely to not believe others would 




















Business N N N N N N N 
Meal N N N N N N X 
Speed N N N N X N N 
Holiday N N N N N N N 
Burglary N N N N N X N 
Auto N N N N N N N 
Supervisor N N N N N N N 
Alcohol N N N N N X X 
Bar N N N N N N N 
Force N N N N N N N 
Wallet N N N N N N N 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 
N = Non-Significant Variables 
 208 
CURRENT DEPARTMENT DIFFERENCES 
 
 














84.4% 15.6% 100.0% 
Agency 2 





93.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
Agency 3 





69.2% 30.8% 100.0% 
Total 





84.5% 15.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NBUSINOS or own view of seriousness was found to be significant for current 
departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.303, p < .05). 
Those who were in Agency 2 (93.3%) were more likely to find the behavior not serious 




Table 14.2: Crosstab 
  
Nmealsod 









Count 29 16 0 45 
% within Number 
- police 
department 64.4% 35.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 38 6 1 45 
% within Number 
- police 
department 84.4% 13.3% 2.2% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 13 13 0 26 
% within Number 
- police 
department 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 80 35 1 116 
% within Number 
- police 
department 69.0% 30.2% 0.9% 100.0% 
 
 
NMEALSOD or discipline should receive was found to be significant for current 
departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 12.679, p < .05). 
Those who were in agency 2 (84.4%) were more likely to feel there would be no 
reprimand for the behavior compared to those in agency 1 (64.4%) and 3 (50%). An issue 




Table 14.3: Crosstab 
  
Nmealsor 






38 6 1 45 
% within Number 
- police 
department 84.4% 13.3% 2.2% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 
35 4 5 44 
% within Number 
- police 
department 79.5% 9.1% 11.4% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 
10 2 14 26 
% within Number 
- police 
department 38.5% 7.7% 53.8% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 
83 12 20 115 
% within Number 
- police 
department 72.2% 10.4% 17.4% 100.0% 
 
NMEALSOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 32.731, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 1 (84.4%) were more likely to not report the behavior 
than those in agency 2 (79.5%) and 3 (38.5%). An issue to note with this finding was that 




Table 14.4: Crosstab 
  
nmealsmr 






40 4 1 45 
% within 
Number - police 
department 88.9% 8.9% 2.2% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 
36 7 1 44 
% within 
Number - police 
department 81.8% 15.9% 2.3% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 
17 5 4 26 
% within 
Number - police 
department 65.4% 19.2% 15.4% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 
93 16 6 115 
% within 
Number - police 
department 80.9% 13.9% 5.2% 100.0% 
 
NMEALSMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 9.261, p < 
.055). Those who were in agency 1 (88.9%) were more likely to not report the behavior 
than those in agency 2 (81.8%) and 3 (65.4%). An issue to note with this finding was that 




Table 14.5: Crosstab 
  
nspeedor 










department 11.4% 27.3% 61.4% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 17.8% 24.4% 57.8% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 0.0% 3.8% 96.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 








NSPEEDOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.375, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 3 (96.2%) were more likely to report the behavior than 
those in agency 1 (61.4%) and 2 (57.8%). An issue to note with this finding was that 22% 




Table 14.6: Crosstab 
  
nspeedmr 










department 11.4% 43.2% 45.5% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 22.2% 37.8% 40.0% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 0.0% 3.8% 96.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 13.0% 32.2% 54.8% 100.0% 
 
NSPEEDMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 25.591, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 3 (96.2%) were more likely to report the behavior than 




















42.2% 57.8% 100.0% 
Agency 2 





61.4% 38.6% 100.0% 
Agency 3 





11.5% 88.5% 100.0% 
Total 





42.6% 57.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NHOLIOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for current 
departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current 
departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 16.596, p < .05). 
Those who were in Agency 3 (88.5%) were more likely to feel the behavior was serious 




















60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
Agency 2 





65.9% 34.1% 100.0% 
Agency 3 





23.1% 76.9% 100.0% 
Total 





53.9% 46.1% 100.0% 
 
NHOLIMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 13.169, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 3 (76.9%) were more likely to feel the behavior was 


















Count 12 10 23 45 
% within 
Number - police 
department 26.7% 22.2% 51.1% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 13 11 20 44 
% within 
Number - police 
department 29.5% 25.0% 45.5% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 4 0 22 26 
% within 
Number - police 
department 15.4% 0.0% 84.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 29 21 65 115 
% within 
Number - police 
department 25.2% 18.3% 56.5% 100.0% 
 
NHOLIVI or violation of policy was found to be significant for current departments. A 
chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 12.407, p < .05). Those who were in 
agency 3 (84.6%) were more likely to believe there was a violation of policy than those 






















department 68.9% 28.9% 2.2% 100.0% 
Agency 2 




department 66.7% 26.7% 6.7% 100.0% 
Agency 3 




department 34.6% 53.8% 11.5% 100.0% 
Total 




department 60.3% 33.6% 6.0% 100.0% 
 
NHOLIOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 10.224, p < .05). Those who were in 
agency 3 (11.5%) were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for the 
behavior than those in agency 1 (2.2%) or 2 (6.7%). An issue to note with this finding was 




Table 14.11: Crosstab 
  
Nholior 










department 77.8% 17.8% 4.4% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 75.0% 11.4% 13.6% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 15.4% 23.1% 61.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 62.6% 16.5% 20.9% 100.0% 
 
NHOLIOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 40.948, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 3 (61.5%) were more likely to report the behavior than 




Table 14.12: Crosstab 
  
nholimr 










department 75.6% 17.8% 6.7% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 77.3% 13.6% 9.1% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 46.2% 19.2% 34.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 69.6% 16.5% 13.9% 100.0% 
 
 
NHOLIMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.480, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 3 (34.5%) were more likely to feel others would report 
the behavior than those in agencies 1 (6.7%) and 2 (9.1%). An issue to note with this 





Table 14.13: Number - police department* nburgmr Crosstabulation 
  
nburgmr 










department 6.7% 26.7% 66.7% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 13.6% 25.0% 61.4% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 0.0% 3.8% 96.2% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 7.8% 20.9% 71.3% 100.0% 
 
 
NBURGMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 11.702, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 3 (96.2%) were more likely to feel others would report 
the behavior than those at agency 1 (66.7%) and 2 (61.4%). An issue to note with this 




Table 14.14: Crosstab 
  
nautoor 










department 13.3% 24.4% 62.2% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 26.7% 22.2% 51.1% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 15.5% 18.1% 66.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NAUTOOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 20.031, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 1 (62.2%) and 3 (100%) were more likely to report the 
behavior than those in agency 2 (51.1%) were more likely to not report the behavior. An 




Table 14.15: Crosstab 
  
nautomr 






7 17 21 45 
% within 
Number - police 
department 15.6% 37.8% 46.7% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 
12 13 20 45 
% within 
Number - police 
department 26.7% 28.9% 44.4% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 
0 4 22 26 
% within 
Number - police 
department 0.0% 15.4% 84.6% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 
19 34 63 116 
% within 
Number - police 





NAUTOMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 15.696, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 2 (26.7%) were more likely to feel others would not 













Count 0 45 45 
% within Number - 
police department 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 4 41 45 
% within Number - 
police department 
8.9% 91.1% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 0 26 26 
% within Number - 
police department 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 4 112 116 
% within Number - 
police department 
3.4% 96.6% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPEROS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 6.537, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 2 (8.9%) were more likely to feel the behavior was not 
serious, than those in Agency 1 (0%) and 3 (0%). An issue to note with this finding was 


















2.2% 97.8% 100.0% 
Agency 2 





13.3% 86.7% 100.0% 
Agency 3 





0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 





6.0% 94.0% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPERMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 7.051, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 2 (13.3%) were more likely to feel the behavior was not 
serious, than those in Agency 1 (2.2%) and 3 (0%). An issue to note with this finding was 






















department 2.2% 60.0% 37.8% 100.0% 
Agency 2 




department 18.2% 63.6% 18.2% 100.0% 
Agency 3 




department 0.0% 61.5% 38.5% 100.0% 
Total 




department 7.8% 61.7% 30.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NSUPEROD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.436, p < .05). Those who were in 
agency 1 (37.8%) and 3 (38.5%) were more likely to believe there should be a serious 
reprimand for the behavior than those in agency 2 (18.2%). An issue to note with this 




Table 14.19: Crosstab 
  
Nsupermd 









Count 4 28 13 45 
% within 
Number - police 
department 8.9% 62.2% 28.9% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 9 27 8 44 
% within 
Number - police 
department 20.5% 61.4% 18.2% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 0 16 10 26 
% within 
Number - police 
department 0.0% 61.5% 38.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 13 71 31 115 
% within 
Number - police 
department 11.3% 61.7% 27.0% 100.0% 
 
NSUPERMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 9.029, p < .05). Those who were in 
agency 3 (38.5%) were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for the 
behavior than those in agency 1 (28.9%) and agency 2 (18.2%). An issue to note with this 
finding was that 22% of the cells had counts less than 5. 
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Table 14.20: Crosstab 
  
Nsuperor 










department 22.2% 24.4% 53.3% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 34.1% 20.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 21.7% 17.4% 60.9% 100.0% 
 
NSUPEROR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 23.469, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 2 (34.1%) were more likely to not report the behavior, 
than those in agency 1 (22.2%) or agency 3 (0%). 
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Table 14.21: Crosstab 
  
Nsupermr 










department 17.8% 33.3% 48.9% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 38.6% 27.3% 34.1% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 0.0% 23.1% 76.9% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 21.7% 28.7% 49.6% 100.0% 
 
NSUPERMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 18.466, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 2 were more likely to not report the behavior, than those 






















department 60.0% 35.6% 4.4% 100.0% 
Agency 2 




department 27.9% 67.4% 4.7% 100.0% 
Agency 3 




department 26.9% 61.5% 11.5% 100.0% 
Total 




department 40.4% 53.5% 6.1% 100.0% 
 
NALCHOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 13.302, p < .05). Those who were in 
agency 1 (60.0%) were more likely to believe there should be no reprimand for the 
behavior than those in agency 2 (27.9%) or 3 (26.9%). An issue to note with this finding 






















department 57.8% 37.8% 4.4% 100.0% 
Agency 2 




department 20.9% 74.4% 4.7% 100.0% 
Agency 3 




department 26.9% 61.5% 11.5% 100.0% 
Total 




department 36.8% 57.0% 6.1% 100.0% 
 
 
NALCHMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 15.901, p < .05). Those who were in 
agency 1 (57.8%) were more likely to believe there would be no reprimand for the 
behavior than those in agency 2 (20.9%) and 3 (26.9%). An issue to note with this finding 
was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5. 
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Table 14.24: Crosstab 
  
Nalchor 










department 77.8% 13.3% 8.9% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 63.6% 6.8% 29.5% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 26.9% 23.1% 50.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 60.9% 13.0% 26.1% 100.0% 
 
NALCHOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 21.411, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 1 (77.8%) were more likely to not report the behavior 
than those in agency 2 (63.6%) or 3 (26.9%). 
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22.2% 77.8% 100.0% 
Agency 2 





9.1% 90.9% 100.0% 
Agency 3 





0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 





12.3% 87.7% 100.0% 
 
 
NBARMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 8.044, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 1 (22.2%) were more likely to feel the behavior was not 
serious than those in agency 2 (9.1%) or agency 3 (0%). 
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Table 14.26: Crosstab 
  
nbaror 










department 46.7% 15.6% 37.8% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 31.8% 13.6% 54.5% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 4.0% 0.0% 96.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 31.6% 11.4% 57.0% 100.0% 
 
NBAROR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 22.621, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 3 (96%) were more likely to report the behavior than 
those in agency 1 (37.8%) or agency 2 (54.5%). 
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Table 14.27: Crosstab 
  
nbarmr 










department 51.1% 22.2% 26.7% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 34.1% 29.5% 36.4% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 12.0% 20.0% 68.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 36.0% 24.6% 39.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NBARMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 14.794, p < 
.05). Those who were in agency 1 (51%) were more likely to feel others would not report 



















28.9% 71.1% 100.0% 
Agency 2 





11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 
Agency 3 





0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 





15.8% 84.2% 100.0% 
 
 
NFORCEOS or own view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 11.048, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 3 (100%) were more likely to feel the behavior was 













Count 19 26 45 
% within Number - 
police department 
42.2% 57.8% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 11 33 44 
% within Number - 
police department 
25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 2 22 24 
% within Number - 
police department 
8.3% 91.7% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 32 81 113 
% within Number - 
police department 
28.3% 71.7% 100.0% 
 
 
NFORCEMS or others view of seriousness of behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (2) = 9.246, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 3 (91.7%) were more likely to feel that others would 






















department 46.7% 42.2% 11.1% 100.0% 
Agency 2 




department 13.6% 79.5% 6.8% 100.0% 
Agency 3 




department 4.2% 83.3% 12.5% 100.0% 
Total 




department 24.8% 65.5% 9.7% 100.0% 
 
NFORCEOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 21.895, p < .05). Those who were in 
Agency 1 (46.7%) were more likely to believe there would be no reprimand for the 
behavior than those in Agency 2 (13.6%) and 3 (4.2%). An issue to note with this finding 
was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5. 
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department 42.2% 48.9% 8.9% 100.0% 
Agency 2 




department 11.4% 84.1% 4.5% 100.0% 
Agency 3 




department 8.3% 79.2% 12.5% 100.0% 
Total 




department 23.0% 69.0% 8.0% 100.0% 
 
NFORCEMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. A 
chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and a 
significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 17.821, p < .05). Those who were in 
Agency 1 (42.2%) were more likely to believe there would be no reprimand for the 
behavior than those in Agency 2 (11.4%) and 3 (8.3%). An issue to note with this finding 




Table 14.32: Crosstab 
  
Nforceor 










department 60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 38.6% 20.5% 40.9% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 8.3% 4.2% 87.5% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 40.7% 16.8% 42.5% 100.0% 
 
 
NFORCEOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 30.072, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 1 (60%) were more likely to not report the behavior than 




Table 14.33: Crosstab 
  
nforcemr 










department 75.6% 13.3% 11.1% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 52.3% 27.3% 20.5% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 29.2% 37.5% 33.3% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 56.6% 23.9% 19.5% 100.0% 
 
NFORCEMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 14.366, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 1 (75.6%) were more likely to not report the behavior 






















department 0.0% 40.9% 59.1% 100.0% 
Agency 2 




department 4.4% 53.3% 42.2% 100.0% 
Agency 3 




department 0.0% 24.0% 76.0% 100.0% 
Total 




department 1.8% 42.1% 56.1% 100.0% 
 
 
NWALLETOD or discipline should receive for this behavior was found to be significant. 
A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and 
a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 9.753, p < .05). Those who were in 
Agency 3 were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for the 
behavior than those in Agency 1 (59.1%) or Agency 2 (42.2%). An issue to note with this 


















Count 2 20 21 43 
% within 
Number - police 
department 4.7% 46.5% 48.8% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 1 25 19 45 
% within 
Number - police 
department 2.2% 55.6% 42.2% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 0 8 17 25 
% within 
Number - police 
department 0.0% 32.0% 68.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 3 53 57 113 
% within 
Number - police 
department 2.7% 46.9% 50.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NWALLETMD or discipline would receive for this behavior was found to be significant. 
A chi square test of independence was calculated comparing the current departments and 
a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 5.397, p < .05). Those who were in 
Agency 3 (68.0%) were more likely to believe there would be a serious reprimand for the 
behavior than those in Agency 1 (48.8%) or Agency 2 (42.2%). An issue to note with this 
finding was that 33% of the cells had counts less than 5. 
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Table 14.36: Crosstab 
  
Nwalletor 






6 9 29 44 
% within 
Number - police 
department 13.6% 20.5% 65.9% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 
11 10 24 45 
% within 
Number - police 
department 24.4% 22.2% 53.3% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 
0 0 25 25 
% within 
Number - police 
department 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 
17 19 78 114 
% within 
Number - police 
department 14.9% 16.7% 68.4% 100.0% 
 
 
NWALLETOR or own willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant for 
current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 17.078, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 3 (100%) were more likely to report the behavior than 
those in Agency 1 (65.9%) or Agency 2 (53.3%). An issue to note with this finding was 




Table 14.37: Crosstab 
  
nwalletmr 










department 22.7% 27.3% 50.0% 100.0% 
Agency 2 
Count 




department 28.9% 33.3% 37.8% 100.0% 
Agency 3 
Count 




department 12.0% 8.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 




department 22.8% 25.4% 51.8% 100.0% 
 
 
NWALLETMR or others willingness to report this behavior was found to be significant 
for current departments. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
current departments and a significant interaction was found (chi-square (4) = 11.738, p < 
.05). Those who were in Agency 2 (28.9%) were more likely to not report the behavior 
than those in Agency 1 (22.7%) or Agency 3 (12%). 
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Business X N N N N N N 
Meal N N N X N X X 
Speed N N N N N X X 
Holiday X X X X N X X 
Burglary N N N N N N X 
Auto N N N N N X X 
Supervisor X X N X X X X 
Alcohol N N N X X X N 
Bar N X N N N X X 
Force X X N X X X X 
Wallet N N N X X X X 
 
Table Key: 
X = Significant Variables 
N = Non-Significant Variables 
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